Research On The Influence Of Non-state Shareholders’ Governance On The Growth Of State-owned Enterprises In The Mixed Reform Of State-owned Enterprises

State owned enterprises are an important pillar of China’s socialist economy with distinctive characteristics,playing an irreplaceable and important role in many fields such as strategic security,industry leadership,and people’s well-being.The growth of state-owned enterprises is an important guarantee for the stable operation and high-quality development of China’s national economy.However,due to the long-term existence of government intervention derived from multiple objectives and principal-agent conflicts derived from "owner vacancy" in state-owned enterprises,their corporate governance level and operational production efficiency have been reduced,further weakening the development capacity of state-owned enterprises.Since the Third Plenary Session of the 18 th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China explicitly proposed "actively developing mixed ownership economy",the governance role of non-state-owned shareholders in state-owned enterprises has increasingly received important attention in academic research or social practice.More and more empirical evidence suggests that through mixed ownership reform,non-state-owned shareholders can participate in state-owned enterprise governance through two methods: holding shares and obtaining board seats.Under the motivation of safeguarding their own interests,they can achieve checks and balances on state-owned controlling shareholders and supervision of management,alleviate the phenomenon of "owner vacancy" and "insider control",and thus clarify the ownership subjects of state-owned enterprises,And effectively improving its business governance structure is crucial for enhancing the growth of state-owned enterprises and promoting better and faster development of the state-owned economy.Although current research has examined the impact of characteristics such as shareholders,board of directors,and management on corporate growth from the perspective of corporate governance,there is little literature on the relationship between non-state-owned shareholder governance and the growth of state-owned enterprises based on the important institutional background of mixed reform of state-owned enterprises.Therefore,this article takes the state-owned listed mixed ownership enterprises of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-shares from 2008 to 2021 as the research object.Based on the principal-agent theory,insider control theory,property rights theory,and enterprise growth theory,the shareholder nature,shareholding situation,and appointed personnel data of state-owned listed mixed ownership enterprises are manually screened and organized,Using a combination of theoretical analysis and empirical research to explore the impact of non-state-owned shareholders from the perspective of corporate growth.Firstly,from the perspective of internal governance,analyze the impact of non-state-owned shareholders on the growth of state-owned enterprises in terms of equity structure and high-level governance.Then,from the perspective of the external environment,examine whether the impact of non-state-owned shareholder governance on the growth of state-owned enterprises varies across different industries and marketization processes.Finally,based on the above,further analyze the mechanism of non-state-owned shareholder governance on the growth of state-owned enterprises through financing constraints and governance effects channels.Research has found that:(1)non-state-owned shareholder governance can significantly enhance the growth of state-owned enterprises,and compared to governance with equity structure dimensions such as shareholding only,non-state-owned shareholder participation in high-level governance has a more prominent effect on the growth of state-owned enterprises.(2)Compared to monopolistic state-owned enterprises,the impact of non-state-owned shareholder governance on the growth of state-owned enterprises is more significant in competitive state-owned enterprises;The marketization process will strengthen the positive correlation between non-state-owned shareholder governance and the growth of state-owned enterprises.Compared to regions with low marketization levels,the positive correlation between the impact of non-state-owned shareholder governance on the growth of state-owned enterprises is more significant in regions with high marketization levels.(3)The improvement mechanism of non-state-owned shareholder governance on the growth of state-owned enterprises mainly lies in the improvement of corporate governance level,rather than the strengthening of financing constraints.This article not only enriches the research literature on non-state-owned shareholder governance and mixed ownership reform,but also has certain theoretical reference significance for improving the governance structure of state-owned listed companies and enhancing enterprise growth.