Choice Of Profit Model Of Takeaway Platform Considering The Sensitivity Of Delivery Time

The competition for takeaway platforms is becoming increasingly fierce.The Meituan takeaway platform,which was established after "Ele.me",has continued to increase its market share in recent years.In 2020,Meituan’s market share has exceeded 60%,and the scale of merchants has rapidly increased to 6.8 million.After the price subsidy war,consumers are pursuing product quality and platform service quality,and merchants have become an important profit foundation and strategic resource for the platform.The rapid rise of Meituan’s takeaway platform illustrates the importance of the platform’s service quality and charging mode choice for platform competition.In this paper,we introduce the consumers’ sensitivity on delivery time into the two-side market competition model,and construct the game framework of takeaway platforms,merchants and consumers under four earning models,which are based on the access fee model and two-part tariff mode under unilateral(only charge at the merchant side)and bilateral charging strategies(charges both on the merchant side and the consumer side).Research shows that:(1)The platform’s optimal earning model depends on the platform’s matching ability,the intensity of market competition,the sensitivity of consumers’ delivery time,the business-toconsumer network externality and the platform’s commission percentage.When the platform matching ability is weak and the rake rate is low,the access fee model under the unilateral charging strategy is the best for the takeaway platform;On the contrary,when the takeaway platforms’matching ability is not mediate,the commission percentage is high,and the competitive intensity is strong,the two-part tariff mode under the unilateral strategy is the best.When the competitive intensity is weak,and the two-part tariff mode under the bilateral strategy is the best;(2)The matching ability of the takeaway platform under the unilateral strategy,the sensitivity of the consumer’s delivery time,the business-to-consumer network externality and the percentage of fees jointly determine the choice of charging mode.When the sum of the consumer’s sensitivity to delivery time and the business-to-consumer network externalities is weaker than the platform’s ability to match,the two-part tariff should be adopted;when the sum of consumer’s sensitivity to delivery time and the business-to-consumer network is stronger than the platform’ s ability to match,if the platform’s commission percentage is higher,the two-part tariff model will be adopted,otherwise,the access fee model will be adopted;(3)The two-part fee model is better than the access fee model under the bilateral fee strategy;(4)Under the access fee model,if the market competition intensity of the consumer side is weak,the platform should charge bilaterally;if the market competition intensity of the consumer consumer side is strong,the platform should charge unilaterally;(5)In the two-part charging model,if the consumer has strong competition,The platform should provide subsidies to members,so the platform adopts a unilateral charging strategy;if consumer competition is weak and there is no subsidy effect of membership fees,the platform adopts a bilateral charging strategy;(6)There is always a negative correlation between the rake rate and the merchant access fee.The increase in the percentage of the platform directly increases the cost of merchants.In order to maintain the scale of the platform’s merchants,the platform needs to reduce access fees.Based on the conclusions obtained,we finally put forward policy recommendations on the development of our foreign sales platform.