Research On Decision-making And Coordination Mechanism Of Green Supply Chain Misreporting Under Different Channel Modes

With the rapid development of economic globalization and information technology,the competition between individual enterprises is gradually upgraded to the competition between supply chains.Due to industry barriers,conflicts of interest and other factors,manufacturers cannot fully share information with retailers,when developing and selling green products,manufacturers often take advantage of their cost information to maximize their own interests by misreporting production costs to retailers,which leads to asymmetric cost information between manufacturers and retailers,thus hindering the development of supply chain.Therefore,timely and effective information sharing becomes the premise to realize supply chain coordination,and how to coordinate the asymmetric information between supply chains has become a practical problem that needs to be solved.Based on alternative homogeneous product of green supply chain as the research object,and choose to lie about level competition,product and the production cost of the three kinds of operation strategy,studies the single channel,oligarchic competitive channels and exclusive competitive channel structure,respectively from manufacturers,retailers,customers,and the perspective of the whole channel system to explore the best operation strategy selection and equilibrium analysis,The specific research contents and results are as follows:Firstly,this paper takes a green supply chain composed of a green product manufacturer and a retailer as the research object,and studies the effects of production cost and misreporting level on pricing decisions of manufacturers and retailers under three game rules of manufacturer Stackelberg(MS),retailer Stackelberg(RS)and vertical Nash(VN),and carries out equilibrium analysis.The results show that in the case of misreporting decisions,the green level is optimal in RS game,and the wholesale price and retail price are optimal in MS game.Regardless of the dominant power of the supply chain,the dominant player can reflect the profit distribution advantage of the supply chain.In the case of misreporting decisions,when MS game is played,the manufacturer will not misreport the cost information;When RS and VN games are played,manufacturers will overreport their cost information in order to maximize profits.Compared with VN games,manufacturers misreport to a greater extent in RS games,and their cost misreporting behavior damages the performance of retailers and the whole supply chain.Therefore,cost sharing contract is introduced to coordinate green supply chain.The study shows that the cost-sharing contract can coordinate the green supply chain by setting appropriate contract parameters.Secondly,this paper considers channel competition and channel power factors,takes the green competitive supply chain composed of two competitive manufacturers and a single retailer as the research object,studies the influence of channel power structure on the pricing decisions of manufacturers and retailers under the condition of asymmetric cost information,and carries out equilibrium analysis.In this paper,a false reporting decision model is constructed for manufacturers with equal(NYY)and unequal(SYY)power.The results show that: Under NYY game structure,the two manufacturers always choose to overreport the cost information,and the degree of misreporting is the same.By misreporting production costs,manufacturers increase the wholesale and retail prices of green products and their own profits,reduce the green level of products,and damage the overall interests of retailers and their supply chains to some extent.In the SYY game structure,the difference of power structure of supply channel does not affect the final misreporting decision of the two manufacturers,and they still choose to overreport the cost information,but the degree of misreporting is different,and manufacturers with high market positions misreport less.The difference in power structure of supply channels will intensify the channel competition in the supply market,and the weak party will pay more attention to the improvement of the greenness of the product,so as to realize the goal of consumers’ preference for green products and improve the profits of manufacturers to a certain extent,while their misreporting behavior damages the overall interests of retailers and their supply chains.Therefore,cost sharing contract is introduced to coordinate oligopoly competitive green supply chain.The study shows that when the power of manufacturers is equal and the contract parameters are set appropriately,the cost-sharing contract can realize the coordination of green supply chain when the manufacturer is encouraged to feedback the real cost information.When the power of the manufacturer is not equal,the profit of the retailer when sharing is always lower than that when not sharing,so it cannot coordinate the supply chain.Thirdly,considering channel competition and channel power,this paper takes the green competitive supply chain composed of two competing manufacturers and two competing retailers as the research object,respectively studies the influence of MS,RS and VN power structure on the pricing decisions of manufacturers and retailers under the condition of asymmetric cost information and carries out equilibrium analysis.The results show that both manufacturers choose to overreport the cost information in the three games,and the degree of misreporting is the same in each game.By comparing the factors of misreporting in the three games,we find that the degree of misreporting in Nash game is the largest.At the same time,the comparison of supply chain equilibrium decisions under different power structures shows that when the production cost is small,manufacturers benefit from their own leadership.When product competition is moderate,retailers benefit from their leadership;When the cost is high and the product competition is fierce,VN game is the optimal equilibrium strategy.By misreporting production costs,manufacturers increase the wholesale and retail prices of green products and their own profits,reduce the green level of products,and damage the overall interests of retailers and their supply chains to some extent.Therefore,cost sharing contract is introduced to coordinate the exclusive competitive green supply chain.The results show that retailer-dominated game and Nash equilibrium game can coordinate the whole supply chain,but manufacturer-dominated game cannot coordinate the whole supply chain under appropriate contract parameter setting.Finally,this paper summarizes the research results,which can be used for reference for enterprises’ business decisions.Meanwhile,the problems to be discussed in this paper are analyzed,and the future research direction and suggestions are prospected.