Research On Electricity Market Transaction Mechanism Considering User Behaviors And Rewards And Punishments In Smart Grid

With the gradual deepening of electricity marketization reform and the rapid development of new energy electricity generation,the electricity market trading mechanism is undergoing great changes.The rapidly increasing demand for electricity has undoubtedly put forward higher requirements for the operation of existing power system,but the mechanism for optimizing electricity market transactions has not been perfected,which has become a deep reason restricting the implementation of electricity reform and the development of new energy applications.Therefore,this paper takes the smart grid as the background to study the electricity market transaction mechanism considering user behaviors and rewards and punishments.First of all,under the management of Power Market Scheduling Center(PMSC),a reward and punishment mechanism is designed to identify unstable power suppliers and punish them for power supply,while restricting power consumption for malicious users and incentivizing non-malicious users.At the same time,considering the users’ electrical appliance classification,a social welfare maximization model is developed to study the impact of reward and punishment mechanism on the electricity market transaction mechanism.The research results show that the utilities of users increase after classification of electrical appliances,the lower the proportion of malicious users and unstable power suppliers,the shorter the convergence time of electricity prices,and the more stable the operation of power system.Secondly,a peak-shaving mechanism is designed to cope with the surge in power demand of users.The users will transfer part of the power demand in the peak period to the off-peak period to achieve the effect of shaving the peak and filling the valley,and the electricity retailer compensates the users for the inconvenient cost caused by the transfer of demand.At the same time,considering the behavioral factors of users in the process of electricity consumption,the impact of peak-shaving mechanism on the electricity market transaction mechanism is studied.The research results show that the optimal electricity consumption of users is proportional to the dissatisfaction coefficient and the upper limit of electricity consumption,and is inversely proportional to the electricity price.In the peak period of electricity consumption,the optimal compensation electricity for a given user by the retailer is proportional to the subsidy rate.When the compensation rate is constant,the higher a retailer’s given baseline,the more profitable it is.Finally,in the regional electricity market composed of distributed energy sources,a penalty mechanism for excessive or insufficient power generation behavior of power plants is designed.Under this mechanism,considering the envy factor between alliances,distributed energy power plants form alliances through their respective surplus and shortage of electricity and transportation costs,and punish the difference between the predicted power generation and the actual power generation.A cooperative game is developed to study the regional electricity market transaction mechanism under the penalty mechanism.The research results show that the change of penalty coefficient has a greater impact on the players in the alliance.If there is some members in the alliance who is preferentially selected for power exchange due to the difference of electricity amount,these members will have a positive feedback on the penalty coefficient,the envy coefficient can negatively affect the members of unalliance or alliances with lower utilities.The trading mechanism considering user behaviors and rewards and punishments in electricity market proposed in this paper can improve the utility of power trading agents and achieve the reducing peaks and filling valleys,so as to enrich the research contents of power trading mechanism in smart grid.