Case Study Of Sinovel Wind Power Delisting From The Perspective Of Regulatory System

The report of the 19 th National Congress of the Communist Party of China proposed to build a standardized,transparent,open,dynamic and resilient capital market,and promote the comprehensive deepening reform of the capital market under the guidance of the registration system.In recent years,China’s capital market has been constantly improving and developing,but there are still some problems: in the aspect of survival supervision,due to the imperfect supervision of listed companies,listed companies’ financial fraud and irregular information disclosure flooded the market,seriously disrupting the order of the capital market;In terms of delisting,due to the imperfect delisting system,low-quality companies evade delisting through various means,which leads to the adverse phenomenon of difficult delisting of listed companies and low delisting rate in China’s capital market.Therefore,how to strengthen the supervision of listed companies and create a smooth delisting channel is a problem worthy of our consideration.This paper takes Sinovel wind power,the first "delisting at par value" joint-stock company in Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share markets in 2020,as the research object,explores the problems existing in the supervision and delisting system of Listed Companies in the delisting process of Listed Companies in China,and puts forward suggestions for improving the supervision and delisting system of Listed Companies in China.Firstly,this paper introduces and analyzes the delisting process and reasons of Sinovel wind power from the micro perspective.It is concluded that the main reasons for Sinovel wind power’s delisting are the deterioration of the company’s business performance,the confusion of the company’s internal governance and the inadequate external supervision.Although Sinovel wind power delisting has accelerated the process of survival of the fittest in China’s capital market,from a macro point of view,it reflects the problems existing in the supervision and delisting system of China’s listed companies: first,in the supervision of listed companies,the internal supervision of listed companies has unreasonable corporate governance structure,ineffective internal control and the lack of effective supervision and restriction on the high transfer behavior of listed companies;There are some problems in the external supervision,such as insufficient punishment by the CSRC and late supervision afterwards;Second,there are some problems in the delisting system,such as single delisting index,poor risk warning effect,insufficient protection of small and medium-sized investors,etc.Finally,according to the problems found,drawing on the advanced experience of foreign countries and combining with the actual situation in China,this paper puts forward countermeasures and suggestions to build diversified indicators,improve the threshold of "removing the cap",strengthen the protection of small and medium-sized investors,strengthen supervision and increase punishment.