Strategy Selection In Complete Information Pricing Game Between Reverse Supply Chains

With the rapid development of the national economy and the substantial improvement of people's living standards,the life cycle of products is becoming shorter and shorter,and many products are discarded as waste products without reaching the service life.Inappropriate treatment of waste products will have a negative impact on the natural environment and social and economic development.As an effective way to deal with waste products,the reverse supply chain has received the attention of the government and enterprises in recent years.As a key link in the reverse supply chain,the recycling of used products affects the benefits of the entire reverse supply chain.Because the recycling amount of waste products in a reverse supply chain often depends not only on the recovery price of itself but also on the recovery price of other reverse supply chains in the same industry,the research on the pricing game strategy between reverse supply chains helps to improve the reverse supply.Chain efficiency and improve the economic efficiency of enterprises.Based on the analysis of domestic and international research on the relationship between reverse supply chain pricing and supply chain game,this paper studies the strategy choice of single-layer,double-layer and dual-channel reverse supply chain in different chain pricing game scenarios.In this paper,the following research conclusions are obtained:(1)Under the complete information,the decision makers of the single-layer reverse supply chain are more willing to carry out the Stackelberg game between the chains,while the role selection in the Stackelberg game is subject to the competition intensity between the reverse supply chains and the remanufacturing of both parties.The common influence of the price of the product,the unit remanufacturing cost,the unit recovery cost and the potential recovery amount in the recycling market;(2)In the chain-complete information static game,the structure selection of the double-layer reverse supply chain depends on the chain Competitive strength.In the Stackelberg game of complete information between chains,the leader adopts an integrated structure,and the follower's structure choice is subject to the competition intensity between the reverse supply chains,the remanufactured product price,the unit remanufacturing cost,the unit recycling cost and the recycling.The common influence of parameters such as potential recovery in the market;(3)In the case of maintaining the original supply chain structure,the structure of the two reverse supply chains determines what kind of game the two parties will play;(4)The complete information static game between the chains In the middle,the choice of recycling channels for the dual-channel reverse supply chain depends on the intensity of inter-chain competition.In the Stackelberg game of complete information between chains,the manufacturer as the leader will choose to be responsible for recycling,and the recycling channel selection of the manufacturer as a follower will be subject to the competitive strength between the reverse supply chains,the price of the remanufactured products,and the unit.The combined effect of manufacturing costs,unit recovery costs,and potential recovery in the recycling market.