| Traditional cryptographic algorithms cannot adapt to the resource-constrained application scenarios of the Internet of Things,so lightweight cryptographic algorithms have attracted wide attention in recent years.The PRINCE algorithm is a lightweight cryptographic algorithm with low hardware implementation cost,often implemented in an unrolled structure.It can be widely used in various resource-constrained application scenarios.However,with the development of side-channel attack technology,the algorithm is vulnerable to the threat of side-channel attack when implemented in hardware,thereby affecting the security of cryptographic devices.In this paper,the sidechannel attacks and countermeasures of the PRINCE based on unrolled structure are studied,designed,and implemented.The leakage point of the side channel determines the attack range of the attacker.However,most of the existing attack methods for the unrolled structure are based on the S-box module,and the leakage points of the side channel revealed by it are very limited.Firstly,this paper proposes a chosen-plaintext attack method with stronger attack capability based on the column mixing module of the PRINC,revealing the existence of new side-channel leakage points in the unrolled PRINCE.Secondly,the existing threshold protection scheme of the unrolled PRINCE algorithm requires the use of fourcomponent circuits,resulting in an oversized protection area.In order to reduce the overhead of the protection area,this paper optimizes the number of components required by the threshold implementation protection scheme of the PRINCE algorithm to three components,and realizes a lightweight threshold implementation protection scheme.Finally,side-channel leakage assessment of protection circuits often requires verification of various attack scenarios in conjunction with specific hardware implementations.In contrast,the t-test is a side-channel leakage evaluation method that can ignore the details of the algorithm implementation.In this paper,a side-channel leakage evaluation based on t-test is implemented for the designed lightweight protection circuit,which proves the effectiveness of the protection scheme.In this paper,experiments on side-channel attacks and countermeasures are completed on the ASIC platform and the FPGA platform.Compared with the previous attack methods,the attack method proposed in this paper can expand the number of attack rounds from the third round to the fourth round,and realize side-channel attacks with a deeper number of rounds.According to the synthesis results of ASIC,the lightweight protection scheme designed in this paper can at least reduce the area overhead by about 53.8%.By analyzing the results of the t-test,it can be seen that there is no significant correlation between the power consumption curves of the circuit with the protection measures applied and the data. |