| In recent years,strategic emerging industries have been occupying the core position of industrial layout in various countries because of their strategic orientation,economic dominance and technological orientation.However,due to the high risks in the process of technological innovation,the long-term,arduous and complex nature of the transformation process of old and new driving forces,as well as the intensive and diffusivity of knowledge and technology,most of the technologies of strategic emerging industries cannot be completed by a single entity independently,and require close collaboration and collaboration among multiple entities.Only by integrating multiple resources such as collaborative innovation and sharing can innovation activities be carried out better.However,due to the strong spillover and non-exclusive nature of technology,knowledge and information,it is inevitable that an enterprise will take "free riding" to steal core knowledge and technical information for the consideration of maximizing its own interests,which will cause damage to the interests among the main bodies of the supply chain of strategic emerging industries and seriously hinder the technological innovation progress and long-term sustainable collaboration of strategic emerging industries.Therefore,in order to effectively reduce the occurrence of "free riding" behavior among the supply chain entities of strategic emerging industries,domestic and foreign scholars have mostly explored the development of strategic emerging industries from the perspective of the necessity and intensity of government regulation.However,such result-oriented regulation model can provide warning external mechanism guarantee for upstream and downstream entities participating in the collaborative innovation of supply chain of strategic emerging industries.However,it greatly ignores the spillover of technology and knowledge in the collaborative innovation process of industrial supply chain under the background of digital economy.Although strong diffusion and liquidity of knowledge and technology can restrain the spillover to the environment outside the main body within a certain range under the constraint of reward and punishment mechanism,in the face of malicious competition among the main bodies and greater interest attraction,It is still impossible to avoid that one party still takes a "free rider" behavior under the result-oriented punishment and constraint mechanism.To this end,this study fully considers the transformation of government regulation mode facilitated by digitalization under the background of digital economy,and considers introducing blockchain technology and embedding it into government technology innovation regulation,in order to improve the effectiveness of regulation by virtue of the advantages of blockchain technology,such as distributed storage,smart contract,encryption mechanism and tamper-proof mechanism.Specifically,this thesis firstly analyzes the research status of strategic emerging industries and defines the main participants in the collaborative innovation process of strategic emerging industries.Secondly,based on evolutionary game,this thesis discusses the influence of government regulation on the collaborative innovation of supply chain in strategic emerging industries.The results show that government regulation and cost subsidies are important factors to promote the collaborative innovation of upstream and downstream enterprises in the supply chain of strategic emerging industries.As long as the innovation cost of upstream and downstream enterprises in the supply chain is less than the sum of government regulation intensity and subsidy cost,The system will reach stability at(1,1,1),that is under the active supervision of the government,both upstream and downstream enterprises in strategic emerging industries will choose collaborative innovation.However,if the innovation costs of both upstream and downstream enterprises in the supply chain are less than the sum of government supervision and subsidy costs,the system will reach stability at(1,1,1)or(0,0,1),and even if the government actively supervises,However,the upstream and downstream enterprises in the supply chain still choose not to make collaborative innovation,which will result in the waste of collaborative innovation resources,which is not conducive to the healthy development of strategic emerging industries.In this thesis,the government regulation mode is optimized,the government regulation mode embedded by blockchain is established,and the game behavior of collaborative innovation evolution of the supply chain of strategic emerging industries under the supervision of government technology innovation is deeply analyzed.Finally,Matlab software is used to simulate and analyze the influence degree of each external variable and each participant’s strategy selection,as well as the dynamic evolution process of each participant,which further verifies the positive role of blockchain embedded government regulation on the collaborative innovation of the supply chain of strategic emerging industries,and then puts forward corresponding countermeasures and suggestions for promoting the development of strategic emerging industries.The results show that:(1)Because the income of upstream and downstream enterprises in the supply chain of strategic emerging industries is affected by cost,government cost subsidies and government fines,when the collaborative innovation cost of upstream and downstream enterprises in the supply chain is greater than the sum of cost subsidies and government fines due to the untimely or insufficient government supervision,or information leakage is subjectively and objectively caused by malicious competition among enterprises,profit inducement and other unethical behaviors,and active collaborators are faced with the risk of technology being copied.Even if there is active regulation by the government,upstream and downstream enterprises in the supply chain of strategic emerging industries will still choose not to make collaborative innovation.(2)The stronger the initial willingness of blockchain to embed government technology innovation regulation,the faster the collaborative innovation of upstream and downstream enterprises in the supply chain evolves to 1.Compared with upstream enterprises,downstream enterprises in the supply chain are more significantly affected by the initial willingness.(3)In order to avoid the loss of prospective earnings greater than government cost subsidies,the upstream and downstream enterprises in the supply chain have a "free rider" behavior,which leads to the acceleration of the evolution towards nonselective collaborative innovation strategy.However,when blockchain is embedded in the government’s technology innovation supervision mode,enterprises still choose collaborative innovation strategy.(4)When blockchain is embedded in the government’s technology innovation supervision,on the one hand,with the increase of the average trust coefficient of upstream and downstream enterprises in the supply chain on blockchain technology,the loss of their own prospects will be reduced,and the speed of enterprises to choose collaborative innovation strategies will be accelerated.On the other hand,by permanently storing the default records of upstream and downstream enterprises in the supply chain in the credit history of the enterprise,the embedded blockchain will cause additional losses of reputation and social reputation.Therefore,for many reasons,with the increase of additional losses under the supervision of blockchain technology innovation,the faster the upstream and downstream enterprises in the supply chain choose to evolve collaborative innovation strategies. |
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