Research On Supply Chain Pricing Strategy And Blockchain Participation In Decision-Making Under Different Product Competition Scenarios

For products with high difficulty in authenticity verification,how to deal with counterfeit products in the market has always been a topic concerned by product producers and consumers.With the rapid development of emerging media such as "we media" and short videos,the speed and scope of information transmission are rapidly increasing,and negative information related to selling counterfeit products has a more significant impact on consumers’ purchasing behavior.Facing other competitors,whether it is necessary for genuine product manufacturers to apply traceability information technology and how to optimize operational decisions are urgent problems to be solved.In view of the fact that blockchain technology can provide untampered product traceability information and effectively meet consumers’ requirements for transparent information in the product supply chain,for the secondary supply chain consisting of two suppliers and one retailer,based on the reality that high-value brand products are vulnerable to negative information.Firstly,from the perspective of completely rational decision-making body,factors such as information strength,counterfeit probability and verification cost were introduced to build a Stackelberg game with suppliers as leaders and retailers as followers.Two kinds of pricing decisions maintaining traditional mode(N)and blockchain technology mode(Y)in two-level supply chain were solved respectively,and comparative analysis was conducted.Secondly,from the perspective of bounded rationality as the decision-making body,the dynamic evolutionary game analysis method is used to focus on the mutually restricted blockchains of both suppliers and suppliers to participate in the decision-making parameter evolutionary game model,and the two-dimensional dynamic system is constructed based on the income matrix.By solving the stable evolutionary strategy of the system,This paper analyzes the influence of different proportions of upstream suppliers that choose to join the blockchain mode supply chain under the initial conditions on the final stable state of the evolutionary game and the movement direction of the equilibrium strategy of the system,so as to obtain the blockchain participation decision-making and differentiated product pricing strategies that can maximize the benefits of each decision-making body in the supply chain under different conditions.Conclusions are summarized as follow.(1)in the traditional supply chain scenario,the wholesale price,retail price and supplier income of high-value brand products decrease with the intensity of negative information,while the general competitive products are on the contrary;(2)When the intensity of negative information is higher than a certain threshold,retailers and high-value brand suppliers in the blockchain supply chain scenario have higher returns,while competitive suppliers do not;(3)The price gap between the two types of products is only related to consumers’ expected value of the products,and has nothing to do with the strength of substitution between products.(4)The proportion of high-value brand suppliers and low-value brand suppliers who choose to join the blockchain supply chain mode under the initial conditions will have a significant impact on the final stable state of the evolutionary game.The initial state will affect the strategy selection mode of high-value brand suppliers and low-value brand suppliers in an inertial way,and finally determine the direction of the system’s equilibrium strategy movement.