The Influence Of Some Informed Noise Traders On Market Regulation Under Market Supervision

On the basis of Zhou and Zhen,under the condition that noise traders are partially informed,this paper sets the risk attitude of internal traders as risk neutral,joins market regulators in each period,studies the dynamic relationship between noise traders’ knowledge coefficient,market liquidity,trading intensity,speed of information disclosure and regulatory probability,and explores market equilibrium.In this article,there are four types of participants in the market: risk neutral internal traders,partially informed noise traders,market makers,and market regulators.Under the Kyle framework,we found that the presence of market regulators,the number of internal traders,the penalty coefficient of market regulation,and the coefficient of partial knowledge of noise traders all affect trading intensity,market depth,and the speed of information disclosure.The conclusion also indicates that when the correlation coefficient between noise traders and asset value is positive,the profits of informed traders decrease.When the correlation is negative,noise traders are manipulated by internal traders,which will have a certain inhibitory effect on information disclosure and keep the market in equilibrium.This article finds a unique linear equilibrium solution for the discrete model of the N period,and unlike other articles,it obtains a curve of regulatory probability with respect to time,which changes with changes in various parameters in the transaction.The trend of the curve is reasonably analyzed,and the expected profit of internal traders is a decreasing function of market regulatory parameters and the number of internal traders,which is the highlight of this article.