Research On Supervision Mechanism Of Platform Public Welfare Game Based On Differential Game

Under the Internet plus background,e-commerce platforms gradually adopt gamification design to pursue better user experience.On this basis,e-commerce platforms respond to the national goal of resolutely winning the battle against poverty and striving to achieve the goal of building a moderately prosperous society in all respects by launching platform-based public welfare game products to support the development of industries in remote areas,optimize the marketing form of public welfare products and meet the high-level spiritual pursuit of users.From the specific performance of platform public welfare games,there may be certain illegal activities in consideration of information asymmetry and credit unknown factors in the Internet.Therefore,as the subject of game regulation,how these e-commerce platforms prevent potential risks arising in the interaction of public welfare games,regulate the participation of merchants and users,protect the legitimate rights and participants’ interests and maintain platforms’ social public image are of realistic as well as theoretical significance to the effectiveness and sustainability of platform public welfare game products.This paper investigates the supervision mechanism of platform public welfare game products.First,a differential game model of supervision mechanism was constructed for platform public welfare games.Considering that there is no incentive,optimal strategies of the three parties in the situations of independent decision-making and uniform decision-making were solved,compared and simulated.Second,Stackelberg games were established according to different incentive intensity: weak incentive for merchant,weak incentive for user and strong incentives for both parties.Finally,a differential game model of credit mechanism based on reputation effects was constructed.This model was divided into two cases: non-cooperative and cooperative games in public welfare game.The three parties’ optimal strategies and the game systems’ best benefits were solved by using the optimal control method.This paper also explored the benefit allocation of the three parties under cooperative game.The study indicates that when the platform provides incentives to merchant,merchant’s self-illegal control effort is superior to that without incentives.In the case of centralized decision making,the effort of helping merchant to control its own violations is higher than those of non-cooperative risk supervision,,and the same is true for user.In four non-cooperative violation situations,platform supervisions for merchant and user are separately consistent whether the platform provides incentives for merchant and user.However,in the case of uniform decision,platform supervision intensity to merchant and user are higher than those in the non-cooperative situation.Meanwhile,consider participants benefits.Merchant revenue is gradually increasing from games without incentives(decentralized decision-making,weak incentives for user)to games with incentives(weak incentives for merchants,strong incentives).Platform and user revenue are both improving from independent decision without cost-sharing to weak-incentive Stackelberg games and finally strongincentive Stackelberg game.Furthermore,from independent decision without costsharing to weak-incentive Stackelberg games,then to strong-incentive Stackelberg game,and finally to uniform decision,it is an improvement for the whole game system revenue.In summary,uniform decision with the goal of maximizing system efficiency is the optimal illegal risk supervision mechanism for platform public welfare game product.It can effectively promote the joint improvement of all parties to achieve the overall optimization of the whole system.A finite time game model based on reputation effects is constructed to study the dynamic situation of “Merchant-User-Platform” in non-cooperative game and cooperative game in a time section.Research shows that when reputation penalties are greater than thresholds,merchant,user and platform regulation efforts will increase over time,and the gaps between the efforts of three parties in cooperation games and non-cooperative game situations keep increasing over time too.When the reputation efficiency is greater than a certain threshold,the overall revenue of the welfare game system in cooperative game is better than in non-cooperative game.Therefore,cooperative game is a better choice for platform welfare game products.