Multi-Scenario Evolutionary Game Analysis Of Network Public Opinion Governance For Sudden Accidents In Chemical Industry Parks

In recent years,chemical production safety accidents have occurred frequently,causing huge losses to the economic,property and life safety of the country and the people.Due to the cumbersome production process of chemical enterprises,the production process is both intricate and closely connected,and most of the raw materials,intermediate products and final products used in the production process are highly dangerous.If there is negligence,these raw materials,intermediate products and final products are very likely to have chemical reactions and lead to safety production accidents.If they cannot be properly handled in a short time,it will lead to greater or even irreparable harm,resulting in fire or even explosion.and a series of security incidents.With the rapid development of network media,especially the outbreak of the new crown pneumonia epidemic,the spread of network public opinion has greatly improved in terms of heat,speed,diffusion and influence.The network has become an important carrier of public opinion dissemination,which seriously threatens my country cyberspace security and social harmony and stability,chemical safety incidents will quickly ferment and form a wave of public opinion through the reporting and diffusion of online media.Once the expression of public opinion overflows the track of rational expression,various dormant social contradictions will gradually surface.It is a severe test of the government’s ability and efficiency to effectively prevent and defuse major security risks.Therefore,it is a major challenge for governments at all levels to strengthen and innovate the supervision of network public opinion and properly manage the network public opinion of sudden accidents in chemical industry parks.Based on the problem of online public opinion governance for sudden accidents in chemical industry parks,this paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model of government,online media and chemical enterprises by using evolutionary game theory,and compares and analyzes the evolutionary stability strategies of the tripartite behavior choices of the government,online media and chemical enterprises..At the same time,combined with two typical cases of "3.21" special major explosion accident of Jiangsu Xiangshui Tianjiayi Chemical Co.,Ltd.and "8.12" special serious fire and explosion accident of Tianjin Port Ruihai Company Dangerous Goods Warehouse,Matlab was used to model the scenarios.Deduction and numerical simulation analysis.The research results show that the popularity of online public opinion on sudden accidents in chemical parks directly affects the strategic choices of the government,online media and chemical companies;even if the government continues to increase penalties for chemical companies to actively disclose information,if the government has The punishment of the media is insufficient,and the strategic choices of the government and online media will still fluctuate alternately.The government needs to strengthen supervision on both enterprises and online media at the same time,and eventually the system will evolve to a stable state.The research conclusions of this paper provide ideas for the government to manage the network public opinion of sudden accidents in chemical industry parks.