On Wage Risk Burden System When Labor Contracts Cannot Be Performed

The disturbance of the COVID-19 epidemic has gradually dissipated,but the concern about the wage risk burden when the labor contract cannot be performed has not decreased.Due to the particularity of the labor contract,the wage risk burden when the labor contract cannot be performed is different from the risk burden under the general dual service contract.At the same time,because the reason why the labor contract cannot be performed cannot be attributed to the labor and capital sides,the rationality of the traditional logic of blindly exacting the employer to bear the wage risk is worth discussing.When the failure to perform the labor contract caused by the objective events not attributable to the labor and capital has become a common social phenomenon,the wage risk changes from the internal risk of the labor relationship to the social risk.This leads to the great limitations of the traditional thinking of trying to deal with wage risk within the labor relationship,while the theory of wage consideration,the theory of wage risk field and the theory of social protection can become the theoretical basis for changing the traditional thinking and constructing the socialized burden system of wage risk when the labor contract cannot be performed.As China’s existing wage risk burden system,although the system of job stabilization subsidy has played a certain role in relieving the pressure of employers’ operation by returning unemployment insurance premiums,its implementation effect has been greatly reduced due to its problems in principle,purpose,specific content and supporting legislation.Referring to the legislation of typical foreign countries,the wage risk burden system of unemployment insurance fund to compensate the wage expenditure of employers is established to reduce the wage burden of employers.Among them,the relevant systems of Germany and Japan have many beneficial experiences in the aspects of principle purpose,content design,supporting legislation,etc.,which are worthy of our reference.Therefore,in view of the current problems of China’s wage risk burden system,combined with the institutional experience of other countries,it is necessary to put forward specific suggestions on improving China’s wage risk burden system with the core of job stabilization subsidies.In terms of the basic principles and purposes of the system,on the one hand,we should adhere to the principle of socialized risk burden with unemployment insurance as the core,and on the other hand,we should adhere to the principle of sharing the wage risk of employers as the only institutional purpose.In terms of the specific content of the system,it is necessary to improve the specific content of the wage risk burden system with the guidance of sharing wage risk,refine the application conditions and time with the goal of preventing moral hazard,take the amount of wages paid by the employer as the subsidy standard,and build a whole-process fund supervision model to ensure that the system function can be fully played in practice.At the same time,in terms of supporting legislation of the system,on the one hand,we should amend the Unemployment Insurance Regulations,enrich the institutional functions of unemployment insurance and the use of unemployment insurance funds,increase the general provisions of job stabilization subsidies,and establish a wage risk burden system with job stabilization subsidies as the core at the level of administrative regulations.On the other hand,the Interim Provisions on Wage Payment should be revised to subdivide different situations in which the labor contract cannot be performed,clarify the wage risk burden rules in different situations and the specific situations in which the employer can apply for job stabilization subsidies,so as to coordinate with the specific implementation of the wage risk burden system.