Antitrust Regulation Of Abuse Of Market Dominance By Super Platforms

With the continuous development of the Internet,the platform economy has become an important part of China’s market economy and has made outstanding contributions to boosting the overall growth of China’s economy.Platform enterprises are the main body of the platform economy,and after these years of development,some platforms have gradually developed and grown to form large super platforms by taking advantage of their first entry.These super platforms firmly occupy the dominant position in the market through the control of data,the development of algorithms and other factors,and,have the risk of abusing their dominant position at any time.Based on the inherent characteristics of the platform economy,the emergence and rapid development of super platforms have brought risks to the good order of market competition and triggered a series of thoughts on their regulation by anti-monopoly law.In recent years,domestic and foreign antitrust enforcement agencies have also strengthened their enforcement efforts in the field of platform economy.The European Union has repeatedly issued huge fines to Google for its monopolistic behavior,and the General Administration of Market Supervision and Administration of China has also investigated and administratively punished the abuse of market dominance by super platforms such as Alibaba Two Choice and Meituan Two Choice.In February 2021,the Anti-Monopoly Committee of the State Council issued a special "Anti-Monopoly Guideline on the Platform Economy",and the newly revised and published "Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China" in June 2022 also added some new provisions related to the platform economy,in addition to the "Interim Provisions on Prohibition of Abuse of Market Dominance","E-Commerce Law" and other laws and regulations on this matter.However,based on the new characteristics of the platform economy,the traditional analysis method is still limited in the determination of the abuse of market dominance by super platforms,and the effective application of the antitrust law to regulate the abuse of market dominance by super platforms in the platform economy is still an important research issue.Therefore,this paper analyzes the new challenges brought by the abuse of market dominance by super platforms for antitrust regulation from the general theory,and improves China’s antitrust regulation method for them by combining the relevant practical experience of the European Union,which includes the following four parts in addition to the introduction.The first part is the general theory of abuse of market dominance by super platforms,introducing super platforms and the concept,characteristics and definition of abuse of market dominance by super platforms,and based on this,further analyzing the harm caused by it,which damages the normal order of competition while also infringing on the rights and interests of consumers.The second part is the new challenges of the regulation of abuse of market dominance by super platforms.After introducing the traditional methods and models,the special features of the three steps are introduced respectively: in the definition of the relevant market,super platforms have bilateral markets and generally adopt tilted pricing models for bilateral markets,and zero-price competition has been very common;in the determination of market dominance,it is very difficult to calculate the traditional market share.In the determination of abusive behavior,the abusive behavior of super platforms shows high technicality and concealment,and its consequences often present both positive and negative attributes.These peculiarities make the traditional methods of regulating abuse of market dominance less applicable to super platforms and need to be considered and further improved.The third part is the experience of the EU platform in regulating the abuse of dominant position in antitrust law.Through the analysis of the relevant practice of the EU,mainly the EU Google search(shopping)case,we seek inspiration for China: in the definition of the relevant market,the free nature of the relevant services is not used as a defense for monopoly exemption,and objective evaluation criteria are insisted on;in the determination of market dominance,it is not limited to a few traditional elements but a comprehensive analysis of the special attributes of the Internet industry;in the determination of abusive behavior,consumer welfare can be taken into account.In the determination of abusive behavior,the consumer welfare standard can be considered.The fourth part is to make suggestions for improving the anti-monopoly regulation of the abuse of market dominance by China’s super platforms.Firstly,the definition of relevant market should be improved to adapt to the changes of bilateral market,and the definition of relevant market can be diluted if necessary.Secondly,we should optimize the way of determining market dominance,improve the mode of determining market share and shift to non-price factors,while correctly grasping the consideration of non-structural factors.Finally,the criteria for determining abusive behavior should be improved,and the illegality of abusive behavior should be judged on a case-by-case basis,and infringement of user privacy can be included in the criteria for determination.