Research On Antitrust Behaviors Of Digital Music Market

Digital music platform is one of the important subjects in the field of platform economy.It provides music services that people need daily and becomes an indispensable APP in people’s life.From the perspective of economics,based on the business model of the digital music platform and the technical and economic characteristics,this paper studies the controversial behaviors of big data "killing maturity","exclusive copyright" and algorithmic collusion in the digital music market through qualitative analysis and mathematical economic model.First of all,qualitative and quantitative analysis is used to study the behavior of big data "killing maturity" in the digital music market.On the basis of clarifying the realization mechanism and causes of big data "killing maturity" behavior,this paper analyzes the welfare effects by comparing the three market equilibrium situations of "platform no price increase","platform unified price increase" and "platform ’killing maturity’ price increase".The research shows that the big data "killing maturity" in the digital music market will help expand consumer groups and maximize social welfare in the short term,but will lead to the "double loss" of the platform and consumers in the long term.Therefore,this paper proposes the data technology supervision and antitrust strategy for data regulation.Secondly,the "exclusive copyright" behavior in the digital music market is studied by constructing a mathematical economic model.This study starts with the determination that the copyrights of genuine songs constitute the "necessary facilities" of the digital music market,and focuses on the social welfare changes before and after the platform adopts the "exclusive" sales of digital albums.Considering the platform’s service quality,build a competitive balance under "non-exclusive copyright" and "exclusive copyright",examine the welfare impact of the multi-ownership and single-ownership model of copyright owners on all parties in the market,and explain the platform’s exclusive motivation and verify the model results with real economic phenomena.The research shows that the implementation of "exclusive copyright" on the platform is to increase the profit of the platform itself and the surplus of the copyright dealer at the expense of consumer surplus;the implementation of "exclusive copyright" on the platform is likely to cause social welfare losses.Therefore,based on a series of necessary measures issued by the General Administration of Market Supervision in 2021 to stop "exclusiveness",this paper analyzes the anti-monopoly significance of copyright regulation,and supplements the anti-monopoly strategy of copyright management.Thirdly,we use qualitative and quantitative analysis to study the algorithmic collusion in the digital music market.This study starts with the analysis of the mechanism of algorithm promoting tacit collusion,analyzes the existence motivation and market performance of algorithmic collusion in the digital music market,and studies the factors affecting the stability of collusion based on the equilibrium condition of maintaining collusion.The research shows that the digital music platform in "post-copyright" era has further collusion motivation under the stimulation of profits,and achieves horizontal prediction collusion in the form of price collusion to increase membership fees.But in reality,maintaining stable collusion is related to such factors as cost symmetry of platform enterprises,market information transparency,product differentiation,market concentration,and technological progress.Therefore,this paper proposes the algorithm technology governance and anti-monopoly strategy of algorithmic economic competition.