Profit Allocation Of Fixed Investment Return Water Saving Management Contract Projects

Water Saving Management Contract(WSMC)is a new comprehensive system water-saving service mode that integrates technology and resources.As an operation mode of WSMC,fixed investment return mode has achieved significant water-saving effects in high water consumption industries and water pollution control fields.However,the lack of profit allocation scheme seriously hinders the development and promotion of this mode.Therefore,this thesis studies the profit allocation of fixed investment return mode.For the profit allocation of fixed investment return WSMC projects under the non-cooperative vision,first of all,based on considering the minimum profit requirements of the participants,the net present value is used to determine the water saving profits to be distributed among the water user,water saving company(WSCO)and the financial institution.Secondly,a two-level bargaining process is conducted between the three parties.For each level of the bargaining process,the number of bargaining stages and sunk costs are introduced to overcome the "pioneer advantage".The backward induction and mathematical induction are used to determine the equilibrium offers for different bargaining stages,and the deterrence discount factors are used to redistribute remaining profits and concession profits.Finally,since each participant has four possible balanced offers in the bargaining process of the first and second level,16 possible profit allocations among the three participants are given and the model is analyzed.For the profit allocation of fixed investment return WSMC projects under the cooperation vision,first of all,seven alliance situations can be determined by the water user,WSCO,and the financial institution,namely,one-party alliance,two-party alliance and three-party alliance.Secondly,considering the shortcomings of the traditional Shapley value,combined with the characteristics of the mode that the water-saving income should pay the cost input first,the impact of the minimum income requirement,deterrence and resist deterrence on the water-saving profit allocation is studied,and the corresponding weights and comprehensive correction weights are determined.Finally,based on the Shapley value,the revised parameters of the factors affecting the profit allocation are added,and the cost input is deducted.The profit allocation model based on the revised Shapley value is established and analyzed.The two profit allocation models established in this thesis are respectively applied to the WSMC project of Beijing Y Golf Course,and the profit allocation of each participant under different models is obtained and compared.The results show that(1)the water-saving profit of each participant is related to the minimum income requirement,deterrence discount factors,number of bargaining stages and sunk cost;(2)In the early stage of the development of the fixed investment return WSMC model,the water user receives the most water-saving profits,followed by the WSCO,and the financial institution is the least;(3)The results under the non-cooperative vision are more conducive to the stable development of this mode,and the results under the cooperative vision are more in line with the actual situation.The two models established in this thesis provide managers with decision-making basis and contribute to promoting the implementation of fixed investment return WSMC projects.