| Urban floods occur frequently every year in China.Disasters pose a great threat to people’s life safety and cause great losses to the social economy.A complete emergency material reserve system provides help for pre-disaster prevention,disaster response and post-disaster reconstruction.Due to the particularity of flood control emergency supplies and the randomness of emergencies,the use of governmententerprise joint reserve can effectively solve the above problems.This paper focuses on the government-enterprise maintenance process in the process of governmententerprise joint reserve of flood control materials.On the basis of evolutionary game,the differential game process is introduced,and the game model of flood control materials under different decision-making modes is established.The parameters such as the optimal strategy of government and enterprise,the revenue of government and enterprise and the optimal trajectory of material stock are analyzed and compared.The results show that the maintenance level of government and enterprise can effectively reduce the material loss,and the joint reserve decision of government and enterprise is the optimal reserve mode.The main work is as follows :(1)The government-enterprise joint reserve model is established to introduce the reserve mode of emergency materials and the characteristics of flood control emergency materials.The conflict between the government’s pursuit of social interests and the enterprise’s pursuit of economic interests is analyzed,and the contradiction between the two sides in the relationship between agency and storage is expounded,which provides a theoretical basis for the government’s emergency material reserve.(2)Considering the regulatory game problem in government-enterprise joint reserve,an evolutionary game model is constructed to analyze the influence of both strategies on their respective income functions.Combined with the process of system dynamics modeling,the dynamics of mixed strategic game between government and enterprises is explored.(3)A differential game model is constructed to study the influence of governmententerprise maintenance level and maintenance level on material loss and system profit under government single reserve decision,government-enterprise joint reserve decision and Stackelberg decision,and the parameters such as strategy selection,revenue and optimal trajectory of material stock are compared under different decision models.(4)Combined with the Wuhan flood disaster case,the sensitivity analysis of the parameters such as the probability of natural state change,the penalty coefficient and the maintenance cost is carried out.In a variety of reserve decisions,the governmententerprise joint reserve decision is better than the Stackelberg decision is better than the government single reserve decision,which is consistent with the actual situation.It is proved that the differential game model has advantages in solving the problem of government-enterprise joint reserve of flood control emergency materials,and has reference significance for the government emergency material reserve work. |
