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Evolutionary Game Behavior Analysis Of Passive Building Based On Government Investment EPC Model

Posted on:2024-05-20Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:K Q ZhaoFull Text:PDF
GTID:2542307097971109Subject:Civil Engineering and Water Conservancy (Professional Degree)
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
The total energy consumption of the construction industry throughout the construction process has always been a high proportion of the total energy consumption of the country.In order to achieve China’s goal of carbon neutrality as soon as possible,building energy efficiency is a must for the construction industry at this stage.Passive buildings are one of the near-zero energy building systems,which can efficiently use natural conditions and improve indoor air quality.While reducing energy demand,it can meet the living needs of indoor heating and cooling.The Ministry of Housing and Construction clearly pointed out in 2016 that "government investment projects and assembled buildings should actively adopt the general contracting model".The EPC model has the advantages that other general contracting models are dwarfed by it.Therefore,government investment projects often use the EPC model.At the same time,the EPC model is widely applicable in the implementation of passive building projects due to its advantages of shortening construction period and reducing cost.This paper highlights the passive building under the government investment EPC model.Taking the government,construction units and general contractors as the subjects of the study.Using evolutionary game theory to determine the key parameters driving the evolutionary stability of the tripartite.And then using Matlab for simulation.Based on the simulation results,recommendations and countermeasures are developed for the government,construction units and general contractors respectively.First,the behaviors and benefits of the stakeholders-the government,the construction unit and the general contractor-are analyzed in detail.The government is the investor of the whole project.It can utilize incentive policies to guide and intervene with construction units and general contractors to choose passive buildings so that social and environmental benefits can be obtained.The construction unit is the main body that uses government investment funds to organize the construction of the project.The general contractor is a contractor who provides design,construction and installation services in an EPC project.The behaviors and benefits of the government,construction unit and general contractor are consistent with the constraints of evolutionary game theory,which provides a theoretical basis for constructing an evolutionary game model.Second,the evolutionary game model is developed.The applicability of evolutionary game theory is described,and the parameters required for the evolutionary game are determined based on the analysis of the behaviors and benefits of the government,the construction unit and the general contractor of the project.Based on evolutionary game theory,the key parameters of the optimal evolutionary path of the three-party evolutionary game are derived by replicating the dynamic equations and using Jacobi matrices to determine the stability of each point,which provides a basis for using Matlab simulation to determine the effect of parameter changes on the choice of three-party behavior.Again,the evolutionary game simulation is performed by Matlab.Scientific quantitative data analysis methods are used to study and analyze the optimal behavioral choices of the government,construction units and general contractors.According to the results of the evolutionary game model above,by adjusting the key parameters under the optimal evolutionary path in the evolutionary game model,the changes and trends of the behavior and benefits of the three parties of the relevant parameter changes are explored,and their effects on the changes of the behavior choices of the government,the construction unit and the general contractor are derived.Finally,the conclusion and recommendations.According to the above research and simulation,the optimal behavioral choices of the government,the construction unit and the general contractor and the interactions between the parties are analyzed and studied.To provide recommendations for the government,construction units and general contractors to actively choose passive buildings.It has implications for the healthy and orderly development of passive buildings in China under the EPC project general contracting mode.
Keywords/Search Tags:passive building, evolutionary game, government investment, EPC
PDF Full Text Request
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