Party Organization Governance In State-Owned Listed Companies,Analysts’ Attention And Leverage Manipulation

The systemic risk caused by high leverage has been widely concerned by the state and all sectors of society.In order to prevent and resolve critical financial risks,the state has issued a series of "de-leveraging" policies to remove the unreasonable liabilities of enterprises,especially state-owned enterprises.However,in order to maintain the existing profits,some state-owned enterprises refuse to substantially reduce leverage,they take leverage manipulation to meet the policy and regulatory needs.At present,there are few studies on leverage manipulation in the existing literature,most studies mainly focus on the impact of high leverage ratio,financing constraints and de-leveraging policy pressure on leverage manipulation.However,few scholars have studied and analyzed whether the leverage manipulation behavior that changes the financial situation of enterprises will be affected by Party organizations governance in state-owned enterprises.There is a deep legal support for Party organizations governance.China’s laws,regulations and policy documents give the party organizations of state-owned enterprises the main qualification to participate in governance.In addition,Party organizations governance can form effective balances on insider control,effectively supervise the management of state-owned enterprises,and make up for the "absence of owners" of state-owned enterprises.As a means of external supervision,analysts’ attention can not only master the company’s financial situation and the implementation of internal control through analysts’ professional financial and accounting knowledge,but also excavate the company’s internal private information through field research.Under the synergy with Party organization governance,analysts’ attention affects the relationship between Party organization governance and leverage manipulation in state-owned enterprises.Therefore,in the process of studying the impact of Party organization governance on leverage manipulation of state-owned enterprises,this paper further considers the role of analysts’ attention,which is to further deepen how to reduce leverage manipulation of state-owned enterprises.Firstly,this paper combs the relevant literature in the field of Party organization governance and leverage manipulation,and then analyses the impact of Party organization governance on leverage manipulation in state-owned listed companies from the two ways of "two-way entry" and "cross appointment",as well as the regulatory role of analysts’ attention in the relationship between the two.This paper selects A-share state-owned listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2015 to2019 as the research sample,uses Tobit model to analyse,and further analyses the heterogeneity from two aspects of macroeconomic environment and enterprise characteristics.The study found that the party organizations governance of state-owned listed companies significantly inhibited leverage manipulation under the two ways.Analysts’ attention played a negative regulatory role in the relationship between Party organization governance and leverage manipulation in state-owned listed companies.Further research found that when the uncertainty of economic policy is low and in the central state-owned listed companies,the effect of Party organization governance on leverage manipulation is more significant.The research of this paper expands the research scope in the field of Party organization governance and leverage manipulation,provides a reference for state-owned listed companies on how to curb leverage manipulation,and provides empirical evidence for further strengthening the political core position of Party organization in state-owned listed companies and improving the internal governance mechanism of state-owned listed companies.