The Research On State-owned Listed Corporation Governance Basing On The Principal-agent Theory

The effective governance is basic condition that enterprise access higher operating performance and sustainable development for a long time. A variety of governance mechanisms of state-owned listed companies gradually expose much question in china, they seriously hindered sustainable development of state-owned listed companies. Therefore, it is necessary that to improve corporate governance of state-owned listed companies.Principal—-agent theory is a major component of corporate governance theory and it is known as the mainstream corporate governance theory. The article synthesis corporate governance based on Comprehensive study, we quote abroad and domestic study result in light of China's actual situation and think that townships structure is unreasonable, superintendence of the board of directors is ineffective, the function of the board of supervisors is insufficient, the system of the manager's inspirit is incomplete and external governance mechanisms isn't perfect will lead to problems of state-owned listed companies.We analyze the problems of corporate governance of state-owned listed companies through principal—agent theory and found agent of state-owned listed companies will damage the interests of principal and pursue their greatest benefit on the decision-making power and information superiority under principal of state-owned listed companies make the inefficiency of the government's supervision and stimulation towards managers. In order to decrease the cost and the conflict between principal and agent under the separation of the decision-making power and the power of residual claims, main tasks of corporate governance are coordinates the owner and operator's benefit, and achieve the maximization owner and operator's benefit.This article also constructs the state-owned listed companies principal—agent complete information static gaming model under the given principal-agent relationship (non-contractual relationship) between the state-owned listed companies property owners (principal) and the operator (agent). Hypothetically, the principal's pure strategic choice is supervision or oversight, the purely strategic choice of agents is diligent or lazy. In addition, after calculating the game model to get the Nash equilibrium, the article analyzes the model with economic method and obtains the four conclusions that can perfectly function the corporate governance of state-owned listed companies.