Research On The Evolution Mechanism And Control Strategy Of Quality Behavior Of Engineering Constructors Considering Behavior Preference And Random Interference

In recent years,with the increase in the number of engineering construction projects,construction projects have become more and more complex,more and more units involved in construction activities,and the division of labor has become more and more detailed,which has brought great difficulties to the quality supervision of construction projects in China.Although the government,supervision and construction parties should be rational in the actual quality supervision of engineering projects,in complex construction projects,information asymmetry may lead to the inability of decision-making entities to view and analyze problems completely rationally.Therefore,the theoretical discussion of the behavioral preference of limited rational participants in engineering projects is more in line with practical needs.Under this circumstance,studying the evolution game of quality behavior between the government,the supervision party and the construction party is an effective way to realize the quality optimization of the project.In order to more accurately describe the influence of uncertainties faced by participants in project construction,the stochastic evolution game that has been fully practiced in other fields is introduced into the supervision of engineering quality behavior.This method can consider the bounded rationality and information randomness of the game subject,so that the evolution result is closer to the actual engineering project.This method can be used to improve the quality of engineering projects and study the quality behavior supervision of construction projects.Based on this,this paper constructs a three-way evolutionary game model based on evolutionary game theory,including government,supervision and construction.On this basis,the behavioral preference characteristics and psychological factors of game participants are considered,and prospect theory is introduced to explain the reasons for different behavioral tendencies of game subjects,and whether the active supervision of government regulators and owners and supervisors under random interference and the compliance construction of construction enterprises are more effective.The study concludes that the analysis of the construction party’s decision considering fairness preference shows that the size of the construction party’s compliance construction cost has a greater impact on the decision-making,indicating that it is more necessary to implement strict supervision of the construction party when it comes to large-cost engineering projects.The degree of loss aversion of the construction party greatly affects the decision-making speed of the construction party,and the stronger the loss aversion,the faster the construction party chooses compliant construction decisions,so the loss aversion preference is positive in terms of quality behavior supervision;When there are some random phenomena in the construction,such as weather factors,material quality changes,personnel flow factors,etc.,the government’s response is positive,while the construction party is reversed,and the supervision party is somewhere in between.In order to solve these problems,this paper proposes the theory and decision support for improving the quality of engineering projects from the perspective of quality behavior supervision of engineering projects.This means that some effective regulatory strategies need to be developed to better manage the quality of engineering projects and improve the quality level of engineering projects.Through the analysis of implementation cases and Matlab simulation combined with relevant game models,this paper discusses the impact of different degrees of engineering construction site emergency severity on the decision-making of various subjects in engineering quality behavior supervision,and puts forward strategic suggestions to strengthen project quality control from the aspects of innovative quality behavior supervision methods,realization of differentiated safety inspections,implementation of quality-related regular assessment and evaluation,and prevention of construction site emergencies,so as to improve the level of supervision and reduce the incidence of quality accidents.