Research On R&D Decision Of Nev Supply Chain Under The Double Credit Policy

The development of new energy vehicles is an important measure to help achieve the "double carbon" goal.China’s new energy vehicle industry policy is transitioning from subsidy policy to double credit policy.At different stages of the double credit policy to replace the subsidy policy,automobile enterprises face different external incentives,which is bound to affect a series of decisions such as automobile R&D and production.At the same time,at present,COVID-19 has a huge impact on the new energy vehicle industry.New energy vehicle suppliers and manufacturers urgently need to strengthen cooperation to meet the challenge.In view of this,this paper constructs a three-stage dynamic game model of new energy vehicle supply chain on R&D investment,supplier pricing and manufacturer pricing,and discusses the optimal decision-making of new energy vehicle supply chain under government subsidies,integral price and their joint action.In addition,considering the impact of the epidemic on the supply chain of new energy vehicles,and the situation that the double credit policy leads the development of industries after the full withdrawal of subsidies,this paper establishes the cooperative R&D and non cooperative R&D models of the supply chain of new energy vehicles under the background of double credit policy,compares and analyzes the equilibrium solution of the supply chain of new energy vehicles during cooperative R&D and non cooperative R&D,and discusses the influence of consumers’ preference coefficient for R&D and the cost premium coefficient caused by the epidemic on R&D investment,equilibrium price The optimal output and the overall profit of the supply chain.The research shows that: first,if the consumer R&D preference coefficient meets a certain range,the R&D investment of suppliers and manufacturers will be positively correlated with subsidies and integral prices.Second,if the government subsidy and integral price exceed a certain threshold,the profits of suppliers and manufacturers and the overall profits of the supply chain will increase with the increase of subsidy and integral price,and the combination of subsidy and integral price has a synergistic amplification effect on the profits of suppliers and manufacturers and the profits of the supply chain.Third,under the parallel subsidy and double credit policy,the price of new energy vehicles is lower than the optimal price under the single policy,the optimal output is larger and the profit is higher.Fourth,if the consumer R&D preference coefficient meets a certain range and the integral price is greater than a certain threshold,the R&D investment,optimal price,optimal output and the overall profit of the supply chain under cooperative R&D are always greater than those under non cooperative R&D.Fifth,whether cooperative R&D or non cooperative R&D strategy is adopted,if the R&D preference coefficient of consumers meets a certain range,the optimal R&D investment,optimal output and the overall profit of the supply chain will decrease with the increase of the epidemic cost premium coefficient,while the optimal price of new energy vehicles will increase with the increase of the epidemic cost premium coefficient of suppliers,and first decrease and then increase with the increase of the epidemic cost premium coefficient of manufacturers.Therefore,the double credit policy plays a great role in encouraging the new energy vehicle industry to increase R&D investment and improve industrial profits.The NEV supply chain can effectively resist the impact of the epidemic through cooperative R&D.