Research On Production Decision-making Of Auto Companies Under The Dual-Credits Policy

In recent years,China has introduced a number of stimulus policies to promote the development of the new energy vehicle(NEV)industry,such as subsidies,tax incentives,credit policy,battery R&D and charging piles facilities investment.According to the policy,the new energy vehicle subsidy program is planned to be completely regressed in2022.The China’s new energy vehicle credit program and regulations on the corporate average fuel consumption(CAFC)of enterprises(hereinafter referred to as the "Dual credits Policy")will be the main policy to regulate the development of the automobile industry.In the context of the subsidy decline and the implementation of the dual-credit policy,for traditional fuel vehicle manufacturers,the implementation of the dual-credit policy poses greater challenges to fuel consumption under the condition of high standards and strict technology;for the new energy vehicle manufacturers,the financial subsidies will eventually decline completely,which makes the manufacturers that rely on subsidies no longer have the dividend advantage of financial subsidies,but the implementation of the dual credits policy can increase the profits of new energy vehicle manufacturers,and even become an effective means to turn losses into profits.Therefore,based on the introduction of the dual-credit policy,and an overview of foreign CAFE regulations and ZEV program,as well as the domestic subsidy retreat policy and dual-credit policy,this thesis mainly studies the effectiveness and influence of the dual credit policy,as well as credit trading.The main findings are as follows:Firstly,this thesis studies the effectiveness of the dual credit policy and its impact on the environment and auto companies.The results show that:(1)the credit trading will increase the market share of new energy vehicles,and the higher the credit trading price is,the greater the market share is,but the credit trading income should not exceed the unit production cost of new energy vehicles,otherwise it will cause vicious low-price competition among new energy vehicle manufacturers and disrupt the market order;(2)the dual credit trading will bring positive impact on the environment;(3)there is a Ushaped relationship between the profit of automobile enterprises and the credit transaction price,and the minimum profit of automobile enterprises is given.Next,the thesis studies the pricing of credit trading,and discusses the trading mechanism and how to regulate the activity of the credit market.The main conclusions are as follows:(1)the penalty measures higher than the transaction cost of credits is a necessary condition for the credits transaction to be carried out,otherwise the auto company will choose to accept the punishment instead of the credits transaction;(2)the credit supply-demand relationship in the market determines the transaction price and volume of the credit transaction;if the original credit demand is greater than the supply,the credit market will be cleared and the transaction will be carried out at the clearing price;otherwise,the enterprises will trade at the non-clearing price;(3)there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between the credit trading volume and relative size among the credit ratio of new energy vehicles,the CAFC credit coefficient of traditional fuel vehicles and NEV credit((k+λ)/ s),and the market demand of new energy vehicle manufacturers reaches the maximum at the turning point.This thesis,on the one hand,provides a theoretical basis for the survival,production,and pricing of auto companies under the new policy environment;on the other hand,it provides certain reference suggestions for the adjustment of specific policy coefficients in the process of the effective implementation of the dual-credit policy by the government,so as to promote the development of new energy automobile industry.