Research On Collaborative Mechanism Of Rural Waste Management Based On Evolutionary Game Theory

The practical path of multi subject collaborative governance of rural garbage plays an important role in improving the rural living environment,but problems such as pollution and low governance efficiency still exist in the governance process.The interests of rural waste management entities are inconsistent,leading to behaviors that deviate from the overall goal,resulting in the actual governance effect not meeting the expected goals.Therefore,after clarifying the interests and responsibilities of various stakeholders,this study analyzes the behavior of the government,enterprises,and rural residents in the process of rural waste governance,constructs a tripartite game model of behavior evolution,determines strategies to improve the active collaborative governance of stakeholders,and constructs a multi-agent collaborative governance system for rural waste.The study first summarizes the research of domestic and foreign scholars on the collaborative mechanism of environmental pollution control and rural garbage collaborative management through literature research.Secondly,by defining the main body of rural waste management,evolutionary game theory is introduced as the theoretical framework.Next,combining literature research methods and field investigations,this study explores the interests and demands of rural waste governance entities,analyzes their behavior and influencing factors,and provides a basis for the hypothesis and parameter setting of the evolutionary game model for government,enterprises,and rural residents’ waste governance behavior.Finally,based on evolutionary game theory,a model was constructed and numerical simulation analysis was conducted.The research conclusions are as follows:1)Compared with increasing the initial guidance willingness of the government towards corporate governance behavior,increasing the initial active participation willingness of rural residents can better promote active corporate governance;2)The cost savings of speculation and the increase in additional profits from speculation will make enterprises choose speculative behavior,but the increase in speculative losses will have a restraining effect on it.High garbage fees and supervision costs will lead to a tendency for rural residents to participate passively;3)Subsidies rewards,and speculative punishments can both affect corporate governance behavior.Appropriate rewards and punishments can have an impact on the participation behavior of rural residents.However,compared to enterprises,government reward and punishment measures have a weaker impact on rural residents,and the impact of punishment measures on both parties is greater than that of reward measures.Therefore,in addition to adopting a series of guiding measures for enterprises,the government also needs to play a role in rural residents’ supervision,evaluation,and reporting of enterprises by adopting appropriate reward and punishment measures.The government needs to establish internal and external supervision and punishment mechanisms,as well as joint constraint mechanisms,to promote the coordinated governance of rural waste management.