Research On Decision And Coordination Making Of Collection And Remanufacturing Of Used Products Considering Online Collection Service

In recent years,as all walks of life pay more and more attention to ecological and environmental factors,countries actively take various measures to promote sustainable economic development.E-waste is rich in many kinds of renewable resources,and its recycling can effectively alleviate environmental pollution and reduce resource waste,which has attracted the common attention of academia and enterprises,and the reverse supply chain has developed rapidly.At present,academic research on reverse supply chain has gradually shifted from a single recycling channel to a mixed recycling channel reverse supply chain with competition among recycling channels.However,most of these studies still remain in the traditional recycling mode of two or two combinations,but ignore the online recycling increasingly occupies an important part,but the current dual-channel reverse supply chain based on "Internet+recycling" recycling channel competition is becoming increasingly fierce.Providing convenient recycling service to consumers through the Internet to attract offline customers is a powerful competitive tool for online recycler.Then,it is crucial to study how to scientifically price the recycling prices and service level of companies in the dual-channel reverse supply chain based on the characteristic of online recycling company providing convenient recycling service.At the same time,due to the structural complexity of the dual-channel reverse supply chain and the double marginalization of the system as a whole due to the fact that each main enterprise only pursues its own maximum interest,how to design a reasonable contractual coordination mechanism to achieve the improvement of the overall efficiency of each participating enterprise in the supply chain is also a problem to be solved in this paper.Using the theories of Stackelberg game,reverse supply chain coordination and dualchannel reverse supply chain as the basis of this paper,we consider the pricing,service level decision and coordination strategy problems of used products in the reverse supply chain when online recycler provide online recycling service.1)Study the pricing and service level strategy of the reverse supply chain.A dual-channel recycling model consisting of remanufacturer,online/offline recycler,in which the online recycler is considered to maximize its own economic profit in the form of whether it uses the network to provide service to users when recycling,is used to build a decision model.The model is solved by using Stackelberg game to get the optimal pricing and service level decision of each subject under different situations,and the role of service impact coefficient on each equilibrium solution and the impact of online recycling service on the pricing decision and profit of reverse supply chain are explored and numerical analysis is conducted based on Matlab.2)Study the coordination strategy problem in reverse supply chain.The model of reverse supply chain under centralized decision making is established,considering the problem of " double marginalization" in the reverse supply chain system under decentralized decision making where each member pursues to maximize its own interests instead of the overall interests,and coordinating the decision making behavior of each participant by designing two mechanisms of service cost sharing contract and two tariff contract.The effectiveness and feasibility of the coordination mechanism are analyzed with numerical examples.The results of the study show that: 1)The study shows that the profits of the remanufacturer and offline collector decrease as the service influence coefficient increases.When remanufacturing quantity are limited by collection quantity and the price competition between dual collection channels is mild,the profit of online collection improves with the increase of service influence coefficient.In case of unlimited remanufacturing or fierce price competition between dual collection channels,the increase of service influence coefficient will damage the profit of online collector.The remanufacturer and online collector can always benefit from online service regardless of whether remanufacturing quantity are limited.Online service can also realize the growth of total system profit provided that the service influence coefficient is not extremely high.When the remanufacturing quantity is not limited in both cases,the online collector can benefit from online service if the ratio of the service influence coefficient to the price competition coefficient is less than 1/2,the offline collector may also benefit from online service.When the remanufacturing volume is limited in no online service case,the offline collector may also benefit from online service when theservice influence coefficient is low,or the service influence coefficient is high and price competition is relatively flat.2)By comparing the decentralized decision with the centralized decision,it is found that the "double marginalization " problem of the decentralized model makes the profit value of the system lower than that of the centralized model,and the designed service cost sharing contract and two tariff contract can coordinate and improve the overall efficiency of the decentralized decision.The coordination of both mechanisms enable the participants in the reverse supply chain to obtain Pareto-improving profits.