Research On The Mechanism Of Cross Regional Collaborative Reduction Of Carbon Emissions From Transportation And Transportation

The upper reaches of the Yangtze River,as the core region of the country’s western development,have significant differences in transportation,economy,population,and resource distribution.There is also a significant imbalance in transportation carbon emissions,making it a typical region that urgently needs to achieve carbon reduction and sustainable development.Therefore,considering the strategy of cross regional reduction of provincial transportation carbon emissions in the upper reaches of the Yangtze River,a tripartite evolutionary game model is constructed between transportation carbon deficit provinces,transportation carbon surplus provinces,and the central government from the perspective of inter provincial relations.A tripartite evolutionary game model between "government enterprise social public" is constructed from the perspective of multi center participants,and the stability of the equilibrium points of the tripartite game system is analyzed separately,And discuss the impact relationship of each factor on the tripartite strategy,verify the stability and effectiveness of each strategy through simulation,and propose suggestions for cross regional reduction of traffic carbon emissions in the upper reaches of the Yangtze River based on the impact relationship of each factor.Providing reference for the government to formulate cross regional emission reduction policies and achieve cross regional carbon regulation has important theoretical and practical significance for achieving the national goal of becoming a transportation powerhouse.This article mainly analyzes the current situation of transportation development in the upper reaches of the Yangtze River,including the regional overview and basic situation of transportation.The study found that there are gaps in transportation situation in the upper reaches of the Yangtze River,and there is an imbalance in transportation energy consumption and carbon balance.Among them,Sichuan and Chongqing have carbon emissions deficits in transportation,while Guizhou and Yunnan have carbon emissions surpluses in transportation Considering different strategies for cross regional reduction of transportation carbon emissions in inter provincial and multi center relationships in the upper reaches of the Yangtze River,a tripartite evolutionary game model was constructed between transportation carbon deficit provinces,transportation carbon surplus provinces,and the central government,as well as a tripartite evolutionary game model between "government enterprise social public".The stability of the equilibrium points of the tripartite game system was analyzed separately,And discuss the impact relationship of each element on the tripartite strategy,verify the stability and effectiveness of each strategy through simulation,and propose suggestions for cross regional reduction of traffic carbon emissions in the upper reaches of the Yangtze River based on the impact relationship of each element.(3)We have developed an overall framework for the coordinated reduction mechanism of carbon emissions from transportation in the upper reaches of the Yangtze River,proposed the construction of a cross regional reduction institution for carbon emissions from transportation in the upper reaches of the Yangtze River,reformed and improved emission reduction regulations,established a reasonable ecological compensation mechanism,improved the law on public participation in cross regional emission reduction,formulated relevant policies for public participation in cross regional emission reduction,provided financial support,and improved the performance evaluation system,Suggestions for promoting high-quality development of transportation.The main conclusions of this thesis are:(1)Environmental loss can improve the evolution speed of active emission reduction in transportation carbon deficit provinces.As environmental loss increases,the probability of transportation carbon surplus provinces supporting cross regional carbon emission reduction will slightly decrease,while the probability of central government regulation will increase;The central government has a certain binding force on transportation carbon deficit provinces through fines.The government can increase the penalties for lazy emission reduction in transportation carbon deficit provinces,and cultivate a conscious and proactive emission reduction awareness in transportation carbon deficit provinces;The central government will increase the penalties for carbon surplus provinces refusing to reduce emissions across regions,which will also increase the probability of carbon deficit provinces actively reducing emissions,the probability of carbon surplus provinces supporting cross regional emission reduction,and the probability of central government emission reduction supervision;The central government’s cross regional cooperation subsidy is beneficial for promoting carbon deficit provinces to actively reduce emissions,but it will have a negative effect on carbon surplus provinces;Cross regional compensation for carbon deficit provinces can promote government support for cross regional carbon emission reduction in carbon surplus provinces;The higher the regulatory cost,the lower the probability of central government emission reduction regulation;The central government should establish a reasonable reward and punishment mechanism,which can promote active emission reduction in transportation carbon deficit provinces and support cross regional reduction in transportation carbon surplus provinces by increasing cross regional reduction subsidies and fines Transportation enterprises are more sensitive to the cost difference between participating in and not participating in cross regional emission reduction.The smaller the cost difference,the more willing transportation enterprises are to participate in cross regional emission reduction.The participation of local governments in cross regional emission reduction has a driving effect on transportation enterprises,and at the same time,calling on the public to participate in cross regional emission reduction can indirectly promote the participation of enterprises in cross regional emission reduction.The probability of the public choosing cross regional emission reduction is negatively correlated with the cost savings of the public not choosing cross regional emission reduction,and positively correlated with the rewards given by local governments to the public to participate in cross regional emission reduction,as well as the losses caused by transportation carbon emissions on public life and production.The strategic choices of transportation enterprises and local governments will affect the stable strategic choices of the public.The probability of local governments participating in cross regional emission reduction is positively correlated with the fines imposed by local governments on transportation enterprises for not participating in cross regional emission reduction,the ecological compensation paid by transportation enterprises,and the penalty amount imposed by the central government on local governments for not participating in cross regional emission reduction.It is negatively correlated with the regulatory cost of local governments and the rewards given by local governments to the public for participating in cross regional emission reduction.The probability of local governments participating in cross regional emission reduction increases with the increasing probability of transportation enterprises and the public participating in cross regional emission reduction.