Research On Cooperation Decision-making Of Supply Chain Production Safety Under Different Power Structures

Safety production is the eternal theme of enterprise management,as the relationship between enterprises gradually tends to be closer,the supply chain for safety production governance role industry gradually emerged,different power structures under the leading enterprises in the supply chain position is different,the motivation and effect of supply chain safety production governance is also different,although the core enterprise led supply chain safety production governance can effectively control the safety production of small and medium-sized enterprises in the chain,improve the safety production supervision system,but in the process of operation still face a series of problems,first,The cooperation between core enterprises and on-chain enterprises in safety production governance is often flexible,loose and opportunistic,and the governance process is often formal.Second,the governance of supply chain safety production lacks depth and breadth,most of the forms of governance are unilateral factory inspection and audit,and there is a lack of benign cooperation and benign interaction between enterprises.Third,the participation and motivation of non-core corporate governance are insufficient,and it is useless to cope with security governance.The reason is that in the process of supply chain safety production governance cooperation,the two parties still take their own interests as the criterion and lack an effective safety production governance cooperation mechanism.Based on the above background,from the perspective of supply chain,this study first uses multi-case analysis to extract cooperation motivation and binding force,as well as cooperation mechanism,and uses differential game theory to consider the risk aversion preference and reciprocal altruistic preference of decision-makers From the perspective of dynamics,the optimal decision-making and performance of upstream and downstream enterprises in the supplier-led and manufacturer-led scenarios are studied.In addition,the internal law of the game between upstream and downstream enterprises is revealed,the influencing factors of decision-makers’ decision-making are studied,the feasible cooperation path for building a supply chain safety production governance system is discussed,and the contract mechanism is designed.To explore the influencing factors of game outcome and decision-making mode,the main research conclusions are as follows:(1)The cooperation led by manufacturers is the cooperation with "risk avoidance" as the main driving force and "order constraint" as the main binding force,and the main feature is the safety production cooperation mechanism of "service + supervision".Supplier-led cooperation is cooperation with "enterprise reciprocity" as the main driving force and "supply constraint" as the main binding force.The main feature is the safety production cooperation mechanism of "service + supervision".(2)In the process of cooperation under two different power structures,the level of cooperation effort of manufacturers and the level of cooperation effort of suppliers are negatively correlated with the decline rate,and it can be seen that information asymmetry and opportunism among supply chain members will greatly weaken the enthusiasm of cooperation between members.(3)In the case of manufacturer-led,the twoway cost sharing contract can effectively improve the level of manufacturer’s governance efforts and suppliers’ cooperation efforts,and the level of supply chain safety production governance has also been improved,which can realize supply chain contract coordination.(4)In the case of supplier-led,the revenue sharing coordination contract can strengthen the coordination effect of upstream and downstream,strengthen the participation of both parties through the interaction of interests between the two parties,and promote the effectiveness of cooperation.