Research On The Game Of Low-Carbon Supply Chains With Altruistic Preferences

How to achieve energy saving and emission reduction is a current hot issue in low carbon supply chain.There is a relative lack of research on the relationship between the decisions of members in low-carbon supply chains and the supply chain as a whole.This thesis investigates the dynamic evolution of optimal decisions and game strategies in the presence of altruistic preferences among members of a low-carbon supply chain.In this thesis,a game approach is used to simulate and analyze the behavioral factors of manufacturers and retailers in a low-carbon supply chain through numerical simulations.In this thesis,two game models,Stackelberg game and simultaneous decision game,are developed,and two different scenarios,single-stage and dynamic,are studied under the two models.Since altruistic preferences have a very important influence on low carbon supply chain.In building the mathematical model,this thesis takes altruistic preference as an important research object,and analyzes it in single-stage and dynamic models separately,and then obtains the influence of altruistic preference and consumer low-carbon preference on the supply chain system by comparison.The main findings and conclusions of this thesis are as follows:(1)In both the Stackelberg game model and the simultaneous decision game,both singlestage and dynamic games are analyzed,and the specific impact of each decision factor on the supply chain is compared in both games.At the same time,the study of altruistic preferences not only analyses the retailers’ altruistic preferences but also the manufacturers’ altruistic preferences,and then compares the two,making the scope of the study more comprehensive.(2)The specific research in this thesis covers the altruistic preferences of retailers and manufacturers,consumers’ low carbon preferences,wholesale prices,carbon reduction levels,retail prices,and government carbon reduction subsidies.Through mathematical modeling,the game process of the supply chain is simulated.The specific impact of each decision on the supply chain system is also analyzed under different scenarios.Then after simulation,the results are analyzed and reasonable recommendations are given.(3)In both the Stackelberg game model and the simultaneous decision game model,it is found that altruistic preferences of supply chain members can lead to some loss of profit for themselves,but there are situations that can lead to higher profit levels in the supply chain.Therefore,in line with the practical application of the corresponding game,the altruistic behavior of supply chain members should be encouraged appropriately,which is more in line with the long-term interests of the supply chain as a whole.In the corresponding dynamic game model,a different conclusion is reached: altruistic preference decisions are not linearly related to the stability of the supply chain system.The altruistic preferences of both the manufacturer and the retailer can make the dynamic system stable after the game.In both models studied in this thesis,the altruistic preferences of manufacturers and retailers are the same or different enough to make the supply chain system stable.This study enriches the research on low-carbon supply chains with altruistic preferences and has theoretical and practical implications for the decision-making of enterprises and governments.