Research On Incentive Coordination Of Payment For Ecosystem Services From A Welfare Perspectiv

Payment for Ecosystem Services(PES)as an incentive-oriented environmental policy tool has received widespread attention for achieving sustainable ecosystem conservation.Community-based payments for ecosystem services(CB-PES)have also received continued attention for their ability to help PES improve local outcomes and sustain community support.However,there is no agreement on the link between PES participation and income disparities.Current studies focus on poverty only in the effect of PES on income itself or income inequality while turning a blind eye to its effect on income growth.Furthermore,the relationship between PES participation,income growth,and poverty alleviation is still unclear.To address the gaps in previous studies,this study explores the socio-economic and environmental outcomes of PES through a case study of PES in Wolong Nature Reserve(WNR)in Sichuan,China,in two parts:an empirical analysis and a theoretical model.In the empirical analysis section,this study constructs a double fixed effects model and performs robustness checks using methods such as propensity score matching,and then uses a mediating effects model and a moderating effects model to investigate the mechanisms underlying the impact of PES participation on household income growth.The theoretical modelling section uses a differential game perspective to examine whether community-based payments for ecosystem services(CB-PES)can further improve the social welfare and environmental outcomes of PES.In this section,a differential game model that considers ecosystem service values(ESV)is constructed to explore how stakeholders’ nature conservation behaviour evolves depending on community-based incentive coordination in PES,followed by numerical simulations using real data from Wolong Nature Reserve in Sichuan,China,and finally examining the role of participatory intermediary governance in community-based incentive coordination The role of participatory intermediary governance in influencing the economic and environmental outcomes of PES projects is examined.The research shows that:(1)Increased participation in PES can contribute to income growth.Furthermore,the contribution of PES participation to income growth favours small and medium-sized farmers over large ones.However,this contribution can in turn increase economic inequality.Finally,the contribution of PES participation to income growth depends mainly on improvements in non-farm employment rather than on increases in educational inputs.(2)Community-based payments for ecosystem services can mobilize a range of incentive-compatible coordination techniques and practices that ultimately improve stakeholder welfare and socio-environmental benefits.Furthermore,achieving incentive-coordinated community-based PES relies on participatory intermediary governance models.Finally,designing community-based incentive coordination mechanisms in PES remains challenging,as it also relies on finding the optimal coordination coefficient.