Analysis Of Decision-making And Coordination Of Dual-channel Supply Chain Considering Retailers' Two-way Fairness Concerns Under Carbon Reduction Polic

Climate change has become one of the world’s most pressing challenges because of its enormous negative impact on ecosystems.In order to promote carbon emission reduction,various governments have introduced carbon emission reduction policies.The distributors actively adopt the dual-channel sales strategy of “online + offline”,and the supply chain has been transformed from the traditional single-channel sales model to the dual-channel sales model.In traditional supply chain,decision makers are often assumed to be absolutely rational.However,it is proposed in behavioral economics that decision makers are bounded rational and their psychological factors will have an impact on decision making.When making decisions,the main body of the supply chain will compare with others while considering its own benefits.When the members of the dual-channel supply chain feel that the profit distribution is unfair,they will take retaliatory measures at the cost of losing their own profits in order to achieve fairness.Combined with the above background,this paper builds a dual-channel supply chain model consisted of one manufacturer,one online retailer and one offline retailer under carbon tax policy,carbon cap-and-trade policy and carbon labeling policy.Based on consumers’ channel preferences,the optimal carbon emission reduction strategy and the optimal pricing strategy for centralized and decentralized decision-making of supply chain under the bidirectional fairness concerns of online and offline retailer are discussed respectively.On this basis,the Pareto improvement of supply chain is realized by coordination contract.This paper mainly draws the following conclusions:(1)Under carbon tax policy and carbon cap-and-trade policy,manufacturer’s optimal wholesale price and carbon emission reduction are positively correlated with horizontal fairness concern coefficient,and negatively correlated with vertical fairness concern coefficient;the wholesale price and retail price always fall as manufacturers carbon emission reduction.On the contrary,under the carbon labeling policy,the wholesale price and optimal carbon emission reduction of manufacturers are negatively correlated with the horizontal fairness concern coefficient,and positively correlated with the vertical fairness concern coefficient;the wholesale and retail price always increase as manufacturers reduce emission.Under the three carbon emission reduction policies,the retail price of dual-channel retailers is negatively correlated with horizontal fairness concern coefficient and positively correlated with vertical fairness concern coefficient.(2)Under different carbon emission reduction policies,the optimal carbon emission reduction is inversely proportional to the technical input cost coefficient,and proportional to the total market demand;for different retail channels,when the service level of one party improves,the retail price of the corresponding channel increases correspondingly,while the retail price of the other party decreases;however,under different carbon emission reduction policies,the income of dual-channel retailers varies with the change trend of service level.Under the carbon cap-and-trade policy,the optimal carbon emission reduction increases with the increase of carbon quota,while the wholesale price of manufacturers and the retail price of dual-channel retailers decreases with the increase of carbon quota.Under the carbon label policy,manufacturer’s emission reduction efforts,wholesale price and dual-channel retail price all increase with the increase of consumers’ low carbon sensitivity coefficient.(3)Under the carbon tax policy and carbon cap-and-trade policy,the increase of horizontal fairness concern coefficient may lead to the increase of manufacturer’s income,while the increase of vertical equity concern coefficient may lead to the decrease of manufacturer’s income;the increase of horizontal equity concern coefficient may lead to the decrease of the income of dual-channel retailers,while the increase of vertical equity concern coefficient may promote the increase of the income of dual-channel retailers.On the contrary,under the carbon labeling policy,manufacturers’ income may be negatively correlated with the horizontal fairness concern coefficient and positively correlated with the vertical equity concern coefficient.The income of dual-channel retailers may be positively correlated with horizontal fairness concern coefficient and negatively correlated with vertical fairness concern coefficient.The design of the two-part coordination contract can promote the benefit Pareto improvement of supply chain members under different carbon emission reduction policies.