Research On Pricing And Coordination Mechanism Of Low-carbon Supply Chain Enterprises Under Uncertain Conditions

In recent years,environmental issues have become a key factor restricting economic and social development and human survival,and countries have introduced relevant laws and regulations,and more enterprises have begun to incorporate lowcarbon emission reduction into their operations and management to gain competitive advantage.However,there are many problems in practice.On the one hand,the market environment is always uncertain,and the complexity of the environment can lead to the absence or invalidation of historical data on relevant parameters.On the other hand,due to the promotion of low-carbon policies,there are still problems such as low enthusiasm for enterprise participation and opaque carbon information,which may lead to false reporting between enterprises and reduce the overall efficiency of the supply chain.Therefore,the pricing decision and coordination mechanism of lowcarbon supply chain enterprises considering environmental uncertainty from the perspective of carbon information asymmetry are also important issues in supply chain management.This paper mainly considers the problem of carbon information asymmetry in uncertain low-carbon supply chain management,and studies the impact of manufacturers’ misrepresentation on manufacturers and retailers’ own pricing and expected profits.In the case of insufficient historical data on relevant parameters,the relevant costs,market demand and carbon trading prices are considered uncertain variables.Firstly,based on game theory and uncertainty theory,considering the power structure of different channels,the pricing decisions of low-carbon supply chain enterprises under the symmetric condition of carbon information are studied.Secondly,the pricing decisions of low-carbon supply chain enterprises under the asymmetric condition of carbon information are further analyzed,and the impact of manufacturers’ misrepresentation behavior on pricing decisions is discussed.Subsequently,a revenue sharing mechanism is constructed through asymmetric Nash game to coordinate the benefits of low-carbon supply chains.Finally,the research results are summarized,the shortcomings of this paper are pointed out,and the future research direction is prospected.The results show that:(1)regardless of whether carbon information is symmetrical or not,centralized decision-making is always better than decentralized decision-making,and supply chain members expect maximum profits when they dominate the supply chain;Considering uncertainty in the environment hurts retailers’ expected profits and consumer earnings,but raises the expected profits of manufacturers and the supply chain as a whole.(2)When the manufacturer dominates the supply chain,the manufacturer’s misrepresentation not only damages the retailer’s overall expected profit of the supply chain,but also damages its own expected profit,and when the manufacturer no longer dominates the supply chain,its misrepresentation will damage the expected profit of the retailer and the supply chain as a whole to obtain higher expected profit.(3)Under the revenue-sharing contract,the higher the bargaining power of the manufacturer,whether it is for the manufacturer,the supply chain as a whole,or even the consumer,the better.For retailers,however,the higher the bargaining power of manufacturers,the lower their profit expectations.In addition,as the misrepresentation factor of manufacturers increases,manufacturers’ expected profits are inverted in a "U" shape,while the expected profits of retailers and the supply chain as a whole are declining.