The Division Of Administrative Powers Of Protected Area Governance Between The Central And Local Governments

Ensuring harmony between human and nature has become the value orientation of the new era,and the protected area system has become a core part of an ecological civilization.As the construction of protected areas enters the stage of governance system reform and organization reorganization,the protected area governance model is advancing towards the large ministry system with organically unified functions,and the vertical allocation of inter-governmental functions in the protected areas will become an important issue.It is of great significance to establish a protected area management system and solve the problem of the division of central and local governments in the protected area governance.Through the diachronic analysis of protected area governance,this paper preliminarily recognizes the construction process and reform path of protected area system in China.Based on the four-level-analysis framework of Williamson,this paper constructs the analysis path of "social foundation--policy environment--governance model--resource allocation".This paper divides the construction process of protected areas into five stages and explores the limitations and difficulties of the protected area governance in different stages.The analysis shows that under the influence of top-down constraint and bottom-up feedback mechanism,the protected area governance in China is moving towards a centralized mode,and the governance structure between central and local areas is changing with the vertical and horizontal contradictions.In order to realize the rational division of administrative powers of protected area governance between the central and local governments,this paper carries out theoretical exploration basing on the triple particularity of the protected area governance,and built a three-stage decision process of "responsibility judgment--efficiency evaluation--risk measurement".In terms of responsibility judgment,according to the public goods theory,it clarifies the responsibility of supplying all kinds of goods undertaken by the government in the protected area governance,and solves the complexity of the governance object in protected areas.In terms of efficiency assessment,basing on the principle of externality,information symmetry and incentive compatibility,the impact of governance process cost on the governance efficiency of protected areas is judged,and the uncertain impact of governance scope is weakened.In terms of risk measurement,according to the vertical constraint principle,the influence of the risk of public governance and the risk of local agency on the ownership of the rights of protected areas is measured,and the problem of diversified interest subjects of protected areas is solved.Based on clarifying the decision process of administrative powers,this paper completes the summary and sorting of relevant policy documents of protected areas,and establishes a list of suggestions for the division of administrative powers of protected area governance between the central and local governments.This paper selects Qianjiangyuan National Park,Jianglang Mountain National Scenic Spot and Baishanzu National Park in Zhejiang for investigation.From the perspective of governance structure,the cooperation between Qianjiangyuan National Park Administration and local government can ensure the smooth operation of vertical coordination mode.The governance structure of Baishanzu National Park Administration,which transmits pressure from municipal government to county government,strengthens the dominant position of local government.The governance structure of Baishanzu National Park Administration,which transmits pressure from city to county,strengthens the dominant position of local government.Jianglang Mountain National Scenic Spot area has been dominated by territorial management for a long time,resulting in prominent horizontal contradictions between the functions of county and municipal government.From the perspective of incentive,the management subjects of Qianjiangyuan,Baishanzu and Jianglang have different enthusiasm to participate in the protection under different degrees of incentive,resulting in the differences in the judgment results.From the perspective of governance difficulties,the difficulties of governance ability and governance system in the practice of protected areas lead to the transformation of some central authority into common authority or local authority,reflecting the decentralization of power caused by the lack of central governance ability.The lack of incentives obtained by local governments and the difficulty in coordinating multi-local collaborative management require the central government to intervene in the management of some issues,which leads to the trend of the transformation of local authority to common authority,reflecting the upward concentration of power caused by the lack of local kinetic energy.From the two dimensions of perfecting the management system and the incentive mechanism,this paper forms the suggestions for standardizing the administrative powers between the central and local governments.In terms of improving the governance system,the function positioning,setting mode and personnel allocation of grass-roots management institutions should be clarified,and the vertical governance structure of centralization,central-local and decentralization should be established according to the characteristic of protected areas.In terms of improving incentives,through the system of "identifying the subject--judging the target--strengthening the incentive",the analysis of the requirements of the multiple subjects in the protected area governance is completed,and the matching transformation of the demands of stakeholders with the political,economic and moral incentives is realized.This paper has established a multi-incentive system for protected areas,including "reward and punishment simultaneously" type,"promotion in the same direction" type,multi-main body coordination and participation type.