Research On Carbon Emission Reduction Strategies Of Manufacturing Supply Chain Members Under Government Supervision

Since the 21st century,the rapid development of industrialization and urbanization has caused global warming,and the greenhouse effect and extreme weather have become more and more serious,which have greatly affected the normal life of human beings.important issues in the field.Against this background,more and more companies are actively responding to government policies and starting low-carbon activities.Among them,the carbon emissions generated by manufacturing companies in the process of manufacturing and selling products are extremely large,and it is logical that carbon control is a matter of course.areas of focus for emissions growth.In today’s society,the development mode of enterprises has gradually changed from the traditional independent development to the overall development of the supply chain.Therefore,the carbon emission reduction of the entire supply chain system has become a mainstream research hotspot.Specifically,carbon emission reduction in the manufacturing supply chain involves many stakeholders,the two most critical of which are upstream and downstream members of the supply chain and government departments,whose behavior plays a pivotal role in carbon emission reduction.In actual work,supply chain members,as the main body of the enterprise,will spontaneously decide whether to carry out energy conservation and emission reduction based on the principle of maximizing their own profits.This practice seriously affects the enthusiasm of enterprises to carry out low-carbon activities,and the government,as the main driving force for carbon reduction work,will actively take administrative and economic means to guide enterprises to reduce carbon emissions.It can be seen that the implementation and supervision of carbon emission reduction in the supply chain is actually a multi-subject game process.Firstly,by combing previous literature and combining stakeholder theory,this paper analyzes the interest demands of stakeholders of carbon emission reduction in manufacturing supply chain,and summarizes the influencing factors that promote carbon emission reduction of supply chain members spontaneously.Secondly,an evolutionary game model of carbon emission reduction strategy was established with manufacturers and retailers as the main body of the game,and the evolutionary stability of strategy choice was explored.Then,in view of the existence of "free-riding" behavior of manufacturers or retailers,government supervision is introduced to construct the tripartite evolutionary game model of manufacturers,retailers and the government,solve the equilibrium point of the tripartite game,and make numerical simulation with Matlab to promote the system to reach the optimal strategy state.Finally,some suggestions are given to improve the enthusiasm of manufacturing supply chain members for carbon emission reduction.Through the analysis of the above game model,the following main conclusions are drawn:(1)Without government supervision,the carbon emission reduction strategies of manufacturers and retailers are affected by low-carbon investment returns and free-rider returns.The increase in the low-carbon investment rate of return will prompt both parties to spontaneously reduce carbon emissions,so that the system reaches the optimal strategic state of “carbon reduction by both manufacturers and retailers”,while the increase in free-rider income will hinder the carbon reduction of the supply chain.row process.(2)Under government supervision,government punishment,government supervision cost,and government additional revenue are the key factors affecting the choice of the tripartite strategy.That is to say,the increase of government penalties,the reduction of government supervision costs,and the increase of government additional benefits will reduce the probability of "free-rider" behavior,prompting manufacturers and retailers to spontaneously reduce carbon emissions,while simply increasing government subsidies cannot Significantly enhance the willingness of companies on both sides to take the initiative to reduce carbon emissions.The possible innovation of this paper is: on the basis of the carbon emission reduction strategy model of manufacturers and retailers,introducing government supervision,building a three-party game model,analyzing the evolutionary stability of the game system,and innovatively studying how the government implements macroeconomic regulation and control It can force the "free-rider" behavior to become unprofitable,thereby reducing the probability of "free-rider" behavior,prompting both manufacturers and retailers to spontaneously reduce carbon emissions,and then make the system reach the optimal policy state.