Evolutionary Game And Mechanism Design Of Joint Air Pollution Control In Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei Region

Regional atmospheric pollution control about economic development and the public quality of life,has always been the hot spot of the government,enterprises need to be addressed.In the opening game of "the 14 th Five-Year Plan",Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region of air pollution from spreading will usher in a new situation,it is necessary to sum up the experiences of atmospheric pollution control.The central government,local governments,companies and the community constitutes the stakeholders of regional atmospheric pollution control game.First of all,this paper constructs the evolutionary game model,research the participants evolution strategy,discusses the evolutionary stable equilibrium under the replicator dynamic system,and the simulation analysis of the central government regulation effect on the evolution strategy.The results show that even if the supervision of other subjects is small,the reasonable environmental tax system can still effectively avoid the negative pollution control of enterprises.The active participation of the public and the low level of rewards and punishments by the central government may encourage local governments to "free ride".The time cost of public green travel determines their enthusiasm to participate in air pollution control.Then,the double-layer joint prevention and control mechanism includes multi participants for Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region air pollution was designed,the continuity strategy of each body was discussed,and the potential problems that may lead to poor joint prevention and control effects as well as the optimal policy combination and implementation intensity were analyzed.The results show that when the central government jointly inspects the environmental and economic performance of local governments,its incentives are more effective for the joint prevention and control efforts of local governments.A results-oriented study on adverse selection of local government environmental performance may exist;In the process of local control by local governments,the policy of stoppage and production restriction is effective,but it is difficult to urge enterprises to improve the ratio of source control,and the economic cost will be relatively large to achieve environmental goals.The influence of economic growth,industrial structure,emission intensity and other factors on air pollution is nonlinear and interactive.Finally,in order to confirm the theoretical research conclusions,and to test and supplement the mechanism design,based on the panel data of Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei28 cities during 2003 to 2018,and the geographical weight matrix was introduced to construct the threshold Spatial Dubin model.The results showed that in general,industrial structure optimization is beneficial to air environmental governance,while economic development.