Research On Shared Manufacturing Of Manufacturing Enterprises Based On Evolutionary Game

With the development of sharing economy,shared manufacturing has brought new development opportunities to the transformation and upgrading of China and even the global manufacturing industry.Different from the traditional outsourcing and OEM mode,shared manufacturing is characterized by the sharing of the right to use idle resources and capabilities,and the use of advanced industrial Internet of Things and intelligent manufacturing technology to build a capacity sharing platform to achieve effective integration of idle capacity.Developing shared manufacturing is an important measure to realize the optimal allocation of resources and improve the efficiency of resource utilization.The development of shared manufacturing can not only deal with the order imbalance of large enterprises in the low and peak seasons,but also help small enterprises to improve production efficiency and maximize profits.Therefore,exploring the factors that affect shared manufacturing and their impact trends becomes the key to the development of shared manufacturing.In this context,this thesis uses evolutionary game knowledge to study the shared manufacturing problem of manufacturing enterprises.First,the evolutionary game model of two types of manufacturing enterprises sharing manufacturing resources considering speculative income is constructed,and the influence trends of factors such as the risk of technology loss of manufacturing enterprises,the additional income brought by information improvement,and speculative income are explored.The theoretical results are verified by numerical simulation using MATLAB software.Then,this thesis introduces the government supervision mechanism,discusses the shared manufacturing of manufacturing enterprises under the government supervision mechanism,and explores the utilization efficiency of government supervision input and the impact of the ratio of government non supervision and supervision revenue.At last,it discusses the issue of leading other manufacturing enterprises to participate in shared manufacturing by taking manufacturing enterprises that master core technologies and have strong knowledge creation and spillover capabilities as the core leading enterprises.Core manufacturing enterprises are not only manufacturing enterprises that participate in shared manufacturing,but also a sharing platform that connects manufacturing enterprises to participate in shared manufacturing and plays a role of supervision and protection.Compared with shared manufacturing platforms,core manufacturing enterprises have more professional and in-depth manufacturing knowledge.Therefore,this thesis uses the knowledge of the evolutionary game to study the shared manufacturing problem of manufacturing enterprises dominated by core enterprises.The research finds that factors such as initial sharing probability,additional benefits,breach of contract loss,the level of trust,utilization efficiency of government investment,government’s penalty and state award play a positive role in promoting the realization of shared manufacturing in manufacturing companies,while the technology loss risk,additional costs and speculative income play a negative role in hindering the realization of shared manufacturing among manufacturing companies.Based on the limited rationality of shared manufacturing,this thesis constructs an evolutionary game model,which provides more feasible solutions for shared manufacturing of manufacturing enterprises,and makes contributions to reducing the operating risk of manufacturing enterprises,improving the additional benefits,and realizing the win-win of manufacturing enterprises.