A Study Of The Effects Of Information Acquisition And External Disturbances On Evolutionary Games

In biological evolution,organisms that are more adapted to their environment are more likely to survive.Evolutionary game theory is a branch of game theory based on the concept of evolution,which uses evolutionary reasoning to study the evolution process of games and attempts to address phenomena that cannot be explained or predicted by traditional game theory under conditions of incomplete information and non-rational behavior.In real economic life,individuals often find it difficult to obtain complete information,which makes the study of the effects of information acquisition and external interference on evolutionary game theory highly relevant.This paper proposes an improved model that allows central individuals to obtain information about individuals other than their immediate neighbors with a certain probability.The paper investigates the relationship between different types of information and the strategy update process from the perspectives of local and global information acquisition.In addition,an external interference mechanism is introduced to explore the influence of external factors on spatial public goods games.The main findings are as follows:1.The impact of local information acquisition on cooperative behavior in evolutionary games.The central individual has the option to acquire information about specific individuals outside of their immediate neighbors in the evaluation circle with a probability q.The central individual compares its current payoff with the average payoff of these n+1 individuals and makes the decision to update its strategy,taking into account the cost of information acquisition.If the central individual chooses not to acquire information,it will only consider its own and its neighbors’ payoffs when deciding on strategy updates.Numerous numerical simulations reveal that introducing the average information of specific individuals in the evaluation circle can significantly improve the level of cooperation in the population.However,the introduction of costs can impede the evolution of cooperative behavior when the evaluation circle is too large.2.The impact of global information acquisition on cooperative behavior in evolutionary games.The central individual randomly selects n individuals with the same strategy as its imitating neighbor from the entire population.The central individual compares its current payoff with the average payoff of these n+1 individuals in the population to make a strategy update decision.This model more comprehensively considers the strategies of all individuals,but requires a higher cost of information acquisition.Through numerous numerical simulations,it is found that appropriate information acquisition n can effectively promote the development of cooperation.In addition,increasing the selection probability q can also help alleviate the dilemma of cooperators.In a specific simulation setting,there exists an optimal product of the number of neighboring individuals n and the unit cost c,which can effectively promote cooperation.3.The impact of interference on cooperative behavior in evolutionary games.Based on the public goods game model,the paper compares two types of interference modes: global and local.The influence of interference on the cooperation of the population is explored.Numerous numerical simulations reveal that global interference can rapidly change the structure of the population toward the desired direction of cooperation,but its cost is high,which may waste resources.Local interference has a smaller impact on the entire population but can increase the cooperation rate of a specific area in a targeted manner,which is time-saving and labor-saving and can make reasonable use of resources.