Research On Multi-agent Game Of Venture Capital With Government Participation

The synergistic cooperation among venture entrepreneurs,venture capitalists and the government has become a key factor in solving the financing dilemma of enterprises,promoting project implementation and attracting market capital.An in-depth discussion of the three-party game relationship is of great significance in guiding venture capitalists’ investment,regulating venture entrepreneurs’ behavior and building a good investment ecosystem.This study takes venture entrepreneurs,venture capitalists and the government as the three research subjects,and constructs a three-party game model based on game theory to provide suggestions for achieving mutual benefits for all parties.In order to investigate the willingness of each subject to participate in venture projects and its influencing factors,this study constructs a three-party evolutionary game model of venture entrepreneurs,venture capitalists and the government,analyzes the strategic choice tendencies of each participating subject,reveals the evolutionary equilibrium of the system,and examines the mechanism of the influence of important factors on the evolutionary trajectory of the system.The results show that government intervention with appropriate incentives and penalties can increase the motivation of parties to participate in venture projects and facilitate the cooperative relationship among the three parties;a relatively reasonable equity allocation ratio has a positive effect on reaching the optimal equilibrium of the system.Further,for the different cooperation situations of each subject in the process of participating in venture projects,this study constructs a three-party differential game model with dynamic reputation of venture entrepreneurs,venture capitalists and the government,takes into account the possibility of forming cooperative alliances among the subjects,and conducts a comparative analysis of the effort level and benefit level in the cases of three-way decentralized decision,two-two alliance and three-way alliance.The results show that government cost subsidies to venture entrepreneurs and venture capitalists can serve as an effective incentive mechanism to achieve Pareto improvement;compared with the three parties making independent decisions,the two-party cooperative alliance between the government and venture entrepreneurs or venture capitalists has obvious advantages;in addition,based on the Shapley value to allocate the alliance benefits,we get that the level of reputation,the level of effort of the three parties,the individual revenue and the overall project revenue all reach Pareto optimum under the three-party cooperative alliance.therefore,the three-party collaborative cooperation can all achieve optimal cooperation and maximize the benefits of venture capital project.