A Comparative Study Of Differential Response Models For Venture Capital And Venture Business Cooperation

Venture capital is the business investment behavior of investing capital in high-tech development industries with high risk of failure in the expectation of high capital gains upon success.In this thesis,we break away from the static process(i.e.,multi-stage discrete-time model)in traditional research from the perspective of continuous time,and investigate the game relationship between venture capital and venture firms.On this basis,the reputation factor of the venture firm is introduced as a dominant incentive with parameters brought into the model.Finally,the objective persistent effort in reality is introduced as a parameter experimentally to make the model closer to the fact and more accurate.In this paper,the parameters of reputation model are introduced throughout the whole paper,and the HJB equation with or without sustained effort is used as a variable to construct the return function to solve the optimal return.By comparing the parametric solutions under different model conditions.It is deduced that the introduction of the reputation model is reasonable;in terms of effort levels and optimal returns,the Nash game conditions,the introduction of persistent effort is better than the case of no persistent effort,and the cooperative game is better than the Nash game.When the venture capitalist and the venture entrepreneur play the cooperative game,the effort and return of both parties will When the venture capitalist and the venture entrepreneur play a cooperative game,both the effort and the return of both parties will be optimal,and the overall return of the venture capital project will also be optimal,and the cooperative game is Pareto optimal.Finally,the theoretical model is simulated numerically and more consistent results are obtained.