Evolutionary Game Study On Information Sharing Based On Blockchain Smart Contract

With the continuous progress of information technology,information as a valuable new resource has exploded.How to efficiently manage and utilize the massively growing information resources has become an important issue in the information age.Information sharing is one of the important means of mining the value of information.However,traditional information sharing generally has problems such as poor information management,information privacy and security,which lead to the inability of information to be reflected to the greatest extent.Due to its characteristics of decentralization and not easy to be tampered with,blockchain technology has been applied to the research of information sharing by many scholars to solve the problems of poor timeliness and authority control in traditional information sharing.However,there are still problems such as weak subjective willingness of information participants to join the blockchain information sharing chain.This paper first analyzed the information sharing mode under the blockchain smart contract from the perspective of the system,and then comprehensively considered the influence of the amount of information,information quality and other factors on information sharing,by introducing information coordination coefficient,information absorption coefficient and other factors An evolutionary game model for information sharing incentives based on blockchain smart contracts was constructed by using these indicators to describe the dynamic evolution process of the interaction of various influencing factors in information sharing,and then through the analysis of evolutionary stability strategies to find the various influencing factors to achieve effective incentives Then,used the Matlab tool to carry out dynamic simulation of the above evolutionary game model from multiple dimensions to verify the validity of the model,and gave corresponding management suggestions.found in study:(1)When the incentive intensity was low,no matter how the amount of information sharing,the information synergy coefficient,the deposit,and the cost of information sharing change,both sides of the game tended not to share information.At this time,the reputation incentive cannot affect the strategy choice of the participants,the incentive interval is the invalid interval of reputation incentive.(2)When the incentive intensity was high,there was a threshold for the platform subsidy,the amount of information sharing,the information synergy coefficient,and the pre-deposit deposit,both sides of the game tended not to share information in the end,and this incentive interval was an effective regulation interval for reputation incentives.(3)In the process of evolutionary game,the information sharing behavior of the participants changes continuously with the change of the influencing parameters.Among them,the platform subsidy,the amount of information sharing,the information synergy coefficient,the deposit,and the cost of information sharing had important effects on the direction of the system tending to information sharing.Promotion,the cost of information sharing had an inhibitory effect on the system tending to the direction of information sharing.To sum up,through research,it can be concluded that the effective interval of the excitation intensity was the optimal regulation interval of the system.Under the effective incentive range,participants should focus on improving the amount of information sharing,information quality and other factors,so that the benefits obtained by choosing information sharing strategies will increase significantly.The platform should focus on strengthening the technical level and management level so as to reduce the cost of information sharing.Combined with the enthusiasm of the reputation to guide the participants to provide highquality information,the evolution and stability strategy of the participants will be closer to the information sharing strategy.