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Reputation,Trust And Cooperative Behavior

Posted on:2021-11-25Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:F P KouFull Text:PDF
GTID:2518306032978689Subject:Management Science and Engineering
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How cooperative behavior evolves and sustains has always been an unsolved mystery in social science.Trust is one of the most important factors affecting the success of cooperation,and reputation is closely related to trust.Although a large number of studies have proved the effectiveness of reputation and trust in maintaining cooperation,most of the literature has discussed at the group level on the premise of the hypothesis of a completely rational economic man.Members of natural groups differ in their abilities and behavioral strategies,especially when two individuals interact,and the degree of cooperation changes.The correlation of reputation,trust and cooperation was influenced by the differences of individual reputation cognition and the heterogeneity of trust cognition.In order to capture the law of action of these three variables at the individual level,the evolutionary game model and public goods behavior experiment were used to explore the evolution and relationship of reputation information mechanism,trust cognition and cooperation intention under single game and repeated game.Firstly,the evolutionary game model is used to depict trust from the perspective of belief formation and renewal process,and the personal historical input information is used to reflect reputation.Then,Matlab software is used to simulate the evolutionary model,and the expected income diagram is obtained and assumptions are proposed.Secondly,in the behavioral experiment stage,a two-person public goods game experiment consistent with the model is adopted,including two kinds of experiments and four experimental groups.Recruited subjects,collected and analyzed the data,compared the differences between the results of the two research paradigms,verified the hypothesis,and drew the following conclusions:(1)Different individuals have different cognitive trust and attention to their own reputation,and their cooperation belief is positively correlated with cognitive trust and partner reputation.The investment amount of historical partners will influence participants' subsequent cooperation decisions.When the recognition of individual trust is high,if the partner invests more in the previous round,participants will invest more in the next round.If the recognition of individual trust is low,the investment will decrease.(2)The average investment under a single game is higher than that under a fixed scenario,and the frequency of high investment is higher.In a single game,there is a positive correlation between cooperation intention and reputation information and trust cognition.In repeated games,the cooperative belief of individuals is mainly affected by their cognitive trust,while the role of reputation information is less.(3)In the random collocation experiment,when reputation is the public information describing the nature of individuals,individuals,out of concern for long-term interests,perform well in the cooperative game so as to obtain a high reputation value and accumulate their own credibility.Attention to their own reputation plays a dominant role in individual cooperative decision-making.In the fixed collocation experiment,there was no reciprocal incentive for the third party.At this time,the peer reputation was significantly positively correlated with individual trust cognition.Cooperative decision-making was mainly influenced by peer reputation,and attention to peer reputation dominated.Based on these conclusions,an information base of corporate reputation and historical cooperation performance can be established in the market as a reference for inter-enterprise cooperation.Enterprises can use the public reputation mechanism to show their competitiveness and establish a social image;Reputation systems can also be used to find,compare,and select partners.On the other hand,improving the level of trust internally through the reputation mechanism can improve the efficiency of cooperation from the root and maintain long-term cooperation.
Keywords/Search Tags:reputation, trust, cooperation, game theory, public goods experiment
PDF Full Text Request
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