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Research On New Energy Power Battery Recycling Pricing Under Government Incentives

Posted on:2022-11-11Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:X J HuangFull Text:PDF
GTID:2512306767976829Subject:Trade Economy
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The continuous progress of human civilization and the continuous development of science and technology have brought a good life to human beings,but also brought a series of problems such as resource shortage and environmental pollution.In response to the above problems,our country gave his answer,to strive for carbon emissions to peak in 2030,efforts to become carbon neutral by 2060,in order to meet the national energy security,reduce emissions and improve the atmospheric environment,relieve the contradictions of the fuel supply needs,to develop the new energy vehicles become one of the national strategy.But new energy vehicles also bring some problems,with the rapid development of new energy vehicles,now has ushered in the first batch of power battery retirement peak,waste power battery recycling task is urgent and has great significance.The government has also issued a series of policies on the current new energy vehicle industry,trying to guide the relevant enterprises through the relevant policies,so that the waste power battery can be well disposed of.The government’s incentive policies will exert more or less influence on all links of the closed-loop supply chain of new energy power battery,and also bring profits and income to a certain extent for the whole closed-loop supply chain of new energy power battery.This paper discusses the influence of different government subsidies on the closed-loop supply chain of power battery recycling from the following aspects:First of all,the research background and significance of this paper are elaborated,the research ideas,research methods and technical routes are sorted out,and the structure of this paper is arranged reasonably.Secondly,the concepts of closed-loop supply chain,Stackelberg game and government incentive mechanism are described.Thirdly,the closed-loop supply chain model of new energy power battery with noncompetitive recycling under different government subsidies is constructed in chapter 3.Stackelberg game method was used to calculate the model,and then the results were compared and analyzed.In chapter 4,the closed-loop supply chain model of new energy power battery with competitive recovery under different government subsidies is constructed.Stackelberg game method was used to calculate the model,and then the results were compared and analyzed.The main conclusions of this paper are as follows:(1)Under different government subsidies,the profits of battery manufacturers and new energy vehicle manufacturers in the non-competitive recycling model and competitive recycling model are improved,and the profit of battery manufacturers in the independent decision competitive recycling model is higher than that in the noncompetitive recycling model;The profit of new energy vehicle manufacturer in the independent decision competitive recycling model is lower than that in the noncompetitive recycling model.(2)Social welfare is improved when supply chain members choose independent decision-making and cooperative decision-making in both the non-competitive recycling model and the competitive recycling model under different government subsidy modes.The social welfare of the competitive recovery model is higher than that of the uncompetitive recovery model in the independent decision,and the social welfare of the uncompetitive recovery model is higher than that of the competitive recovery model in the cooperative decision.(3)As the recycling cost of battery manufacturers increases,the profit of both battery manufacturers and new energy vehicle manufacturers in the competitive recycling model decreases under different government subsidies.The higher the battery recycling cost of battery manufacturers,the lower the total profit of the supply chain system.(4)With the increase of consumers’ awareness of environmental protection and different government subsidies,the social welfare of non-competitive recycling and competitive recycling supply chain members in independent decision-making and cooperative decision-making is constantly increasing.The social welfare of the competitive recovery model is higher than that of the non-competitive recovery model.The social welfare of non-competitive recovery model is higher than that of competitive recovery model in cooperative decision making.Then,taking NIO e T7 new energy vehicle as an example,the parameter variables are assigned with hypothesis values,Mathematica software is used to conduct model simulation,and the simulation results are compared and analyzed,so as to provide reference suggestions for the government to formulate subsidy policies and pricing decisions for members of the closed-loop supply chain.Finally,the thesis concludes and summarizes the main conclusions of the research process.The shortcomings of this research are explained and the future research directions are prospected.
Keywords/Search Tags:Closed-loop supply chain, Reverse logistics, Government incentives, Game theory
PDF Full Text Request
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