Since the 19 th National Congress of the Communist Party of China,in order to carry out the important requirement of upholding and strengthening the overall leadership of the party,and to strengthen and consolidate the core leadership position of grass-roots Party organizations in rural governance,the “One combination” system of The village party branch and The village committee has been popularized in the rural areas of our country.Because of the incomparable advantages in resolving the contradiction between the village party branch and the village committee,maintaining the leadership of the Party and improving the efficiency of governance,the “One combination”;governance model is favored by the CPC and the country.In this paper,the “One combination” system of The village party branch and The village committee in the new era is taken as the research object,and the process of the “One combination” model gradually replacing the dual leadership model since the reform and opening-up of China’s rural areas is regarded as an institutional change,by using the methods of Dilemma Analysis and on-the-spot interview,this paper probes into the development course,theoretical connotation,practical dilemma and optimization path of the “One combination” system of The village party branch and The village committee in the new era,and gives an overall explanation of the system.The specific connotation of “One combination” system of The village party branch and The village committee can be divided into two levels of individuals and organizations.In the individual dimension,the Secretary of the village party branch concurrently serves as the director of the village committee,and is the “first-in-command ” of the village’s financial and administrative power;On the organizational dimension,the implementation of the village Party branch and the village committee members to cross-serve,to achieve the two groups of personnel exchange.The “One combination” system of The village party branch and The village committee has evolved from a self-exploration of villagers to a grass-roots governance model that is now dominant in the countryside,it has experienced four main development stages: The period of environmental gestation(1980-1988),the period of submerged exploration(1980-1988),the period of vigorous advocacy(2002-2018)and the period of dominant governance(2018-present).From the perspective of governance logic,the system effectiveness of the “One combination” model of The village party branch and The village committee mainly acts on four aspects: easing the conflict between the two committees,improving the governance effect,reducing public expenditure,and maintaining the position of the party.In the face of the query that it is against the procedure of grass-roots people’s self-government for a village party secretary to concurrently serve as a village director,the system of “One combination” by The village party branch and The village committee fully mobilizes grass-roots Party organizations to keep close contact with the masses,and ensures that the choice of a village party secretary is in line with the wishes of the villagers,the core value of villager autonomy should be retained,and the theoretical self-consistency should be realized by virtue of the governance efficiency which is better than the dualistic leadership model.After the completion of the theoretical proof,through on-the-spot investigation and research,it was found that the current “One combination” model of The village party branch and The village committee played an active role in enhancing the modernization level of rural governance,etc,limited by the subjective and objective factors in the actual operation there are the following four aspects: First,the village’s “first-in-command” is overburdened and incompetent;second,the village’s “first-in-command” has too much power but lacks supervision;third,the unclear division of responsibilities between the Party and the government results in a lack of clarity in the daily work of the Party and the government;fourth,the limited ability to solve the deep-seated problems of political contradiction in rural areas leads to the insufficiency of institutional advantages. |