| Poverty is a global problem,and governments of various countries and regions are working hard to alleviate poverty.The Chinese government has been working hard to improve the poverty situation in the rural areas.The poverty alleviation work has achieved remarkable results.In 2020,the goal and task of poverty alleviation will be completed as scheduled,and my country will build a well-off society in an all-round way.However,at the starting point of the new era,China’s rural poverty problem has also shown new features and difficulties:First,the poverty in remote mountainous areas and ethnic areas in western China has not yet been completely resolved,and poverty alleviation is more difficult.At the same time,the impact of the new crown pneumonia epidemic Next,how to balance epidemic prevention and poverty alleviation in rural areas and prevent the population from returning to poverty is a key point of poverty alleviation.Second,the problem of multidimensional poverty still exists in our rural areas.Third,our country has only solved the absolute poverty problem of the rural poor.And solving the problem of relative poverty is a more difficult task.As the core method of targeted poverty alleviation,industrial poverty alleviation has achieved great results in poverty alleviation work,and provided ideas for solving relative poverty and multidimensional poverty.The coordinated governance of multiple subjects of poverty alleviation in my country’s rural industries is scientific and necessary.It is of great significance for coping with the relative poverty of rural areas in our country,solving the multidimensional poverty problem between regions,and defending the results of poverty alleviation and decisive victory in the era of building a well-off society in an all-round way.The collaborative governance of the main actors involved in industrial poverty alleviation can be roughly divided into a government-led model,a poverty alleviation enterprise-driven model,and a farmer organization-driven model.The government,poverty alleviation enterprises,farmers and organizations have a game and cooperative structural relationship.The government integrates limited resources and gives full play to the enterprise.A collaborative governance organization that actively guides farmers to participate,but still faces the dilemma that government-assisted poverty alleviation goes against the original intention of industrial poverty alleviation,poverty alleviation companies face the dilemma of poverty alleviation and the choice of pursuing profit,and ordinary poor farmers have low resource capture capabilities.Innovative industrial poverty alleviation and collaborative participation of the main governance structure must analyze the collaborative governance structure policy choices of the government,poverty alleviation enterprises,farmers,and cooperatives from the perspective of benefit costs.Based on the assumption of a rational economic man,this paper uses the evolutionary game method to construct a three-party game model with local governments,poverty alleviation enterprises,and farmers as the main game players.Each main body has two different strategic choices,and analyzes the stability of industrial poverty alleviation participants in collaborative governance.The strategy selection combination.By copying the obtained dynamic equations and analyzing the Jacobian matrix determinants and matrix traces,it is found that the key cost parameters and key profit parameters that can closely affect the strategy choice of the game player,the key parameters present a positive or negative effect on the choice of the game strategy Influencing effects,it is also found that the same key parameter may have opposite effects on different game subjects.Therefore,through MATLAB software to simulate and analyze the game model,the rewards and subsidies of the funding model can promote the cooperation between the subjects within a certain range,while the uncontrolled cash rewards will have the opposite effect.Based on the evolution model and software simulation,it is concluded that local governments should establish scientific and reasonable incentive mechanisms to provide policy space and open market options for poverty alleviation enterprises to participate in governance.Local governments should actively guide farmers to actively participate in the process of industrial poverty alleviation,while strictly supervising the use of poverty alleviation funds to protect the rights and interests of farmers.Poverty alleviation enterprises should focus on cultivating the ability of farmers to participate in governance and production,improving the level and quality of labor,supplemented by direct capital subsidies,to achieve the purpose of long-term effective participation in governance and production.Based on the conclusions of game models and simulation tools,analyze the situation of industrial poverty alleviation participants in collaborative governance,sort out the problems that still exist in industrial poverty alleviation collaborative governance,grassroots governments lack long-term supervision and incentive mechanisms,and poverty alleviation companies participate in poverty alleviation out of cost and benefit considerations Limited,and ordinary farmers lack the confidence and ability to participate in governance.Therefore,through the strong guidance and support of the government and the role of market mechanism,the market forces are guided to participate,and the experience of industrial poverty alleviation entities that are the grassroots forces for self-poverty alleviation and self-governance of farmers are tapped,and then coordinated with the entities participating in the rural industrial poverty alleviation in my country Governance puts forward the following countermeasures and suggestions:play the role of the government in formulating long-term poverty alleviation policies,optimize the selection path of poverty alleviation corporate governance participation,and cultivate farmers’ confidence and technology in self-poverty alleviation to improve the stability of the collaborative governance structure of industrial poverty alleviation entities. |
