Construction And Optimization Decision Of Medicare Of Impoverished People With The Policy Of Targeted Poverty Alleviation

Healthy longevity is the basic goal of human pursuit.Relevant statistics show that disease is one of the main factors affecting human life,and the impact of disease on the poor population is more significant.Because of the improvement of medical technology,the uneven distribution of quality medical resources and the increase of medical cost,the medical expenses that people have to bear in the face of diseases are increasing year by year,especially some chronic diseases and major diseases.This is undoubtedly a great pressure on families who have long been near or below the poverty line.As far as the current situation of "poor people because of illness" is concerned,the vast majority of poor people can only stay in poverty for a long time because of the perennial entanglement of disease.It is of great theoretical and practical significance to establish and effectively run a standardized and complete medical security system under the background of precision poverty alleviation strategy and optimize the handling of its related problems.In view of this,this paper takes the medical security system of the poor population under the strategy of precision poverty alleviation as the research background to comprehensively use the supply chain optimization decision-making,cost sharing game,supervision game and other theories and methods to study the optimization decision-making of the medical security system for the poor population,especially the chronic disease group.Next,the impoverished people under the current standards by 2020 will all be lifted out of poverty.However,this not mean that there will be no more impoverished people after that.Basic medical insurance,critical illness insurance program and medical assistance are important guarantees to prevent the emergence of impoverished people.This paper establishment of a tripartite system of sharing medical expenses,which may still require additional reimbursement.We consider the problem of sharing additional expenses of medical insurance,introduce the theory of supply chain and game theory,and transform the problem into a multi-party cost-sharing problem.We have constructed a cost-sharing model,to simplify the calculation of the proportions of parties,assume in which the basic medical insurance covers all the additional expenses,and critical illness insurance program and medical assistance achieve the purpose of sharing the additional reimbursement expenses by assuming the basic reimbursement expenses of the former.Then,the contract-bargaining process is composed of two Nash bargaining models.The problem of conflict and cost sharing is resolved according to the result of tripartite consultation,and the optimal decision of final cost sharing ratio is obtained.Finally,through the mathematical analysis of abovementioned results,the more additional costs are borne,the more the basic costs are borne by critical illness insurance program and medical assistance,and the validity and correctness of the model are proved by data simulation.Finally,in order to make the standardized medical security model and reasonable medical cost sharing decision really play its due role in improving the present situation of the poor population "caused by illness ",effective supervision measures are needed.In particular,the service attitude of primary medical institutions,the degree of professionalism and the primary medical institutions for the correct implementation of medical insurance reimbursement policy supervision.In addition to the supervision of relevant departments,the supervision of third-party public opinion formed by the public on the Internet multimedia platform can not be ignored.After analyzing the game decisions of basic medical institutions and regulators,this paper adds third-party supervision,especially considering the participation of third-party supervision and the authenticity of the information transmitted to the outside,and constructs an evolutionary game model based on tripartite supervision.Through the analysis,the more likely the formation of the third-party public opinion supervision and the higher the authenticity of the public opinion itself,the public opinion supervision will play a substitute role in the supervision of the supervision department;at the same time,the higher the formation possibility of the third-party public opinion supervision will urge the primary medical institutions to regulate their own behavior.When the formation probability of third-party public opinion supervision is high,but the information transmitted to the outside is mostly deliberately smear false information,it will have a negative impact on supervision.This requires government departments to regulate and manage the authenticity of third-party supervision to avoid the adverse consequences caused by false information.