Research On The Application Of Experimental Economics In The Electricity Market

After the reform and opening up,China’s power industry has developed rapidly and is a veritable power industry power.However,there are still a series of problems such as low power asset operation efficiency and difficulty in connecting renewable power sources.In order to improve these conditions,restore the value of electricity,the Chinese government is promoting a new round of power market reforms.China’s electricity market reform has experienced the last round of stagnation and is still in its infancy.There are still a large number of mechanism design,policy evaluation and other issues that need to be resolved.For this reason,this paper introduces experimental economics methods for research.Experimental economics is an economic research method that has entered the mainstream of economics in recent years.After Vernon Smith won the Nobel Prize in Economics for his contributions to the theory and practice of experimental economics in 2002,more and more scholars have carried out research on experimental economics.Experimental economics can effectively supplement the deficiencies of theoretical analysis by controlling experimental conditions,observing the behavior of experimenters and analyzing experimental results to test,compare and improve economic theories or provide decision-making basis.Applying experimental economics to power market research can provide beneficial help for the construction of my country’s power market.Based on the basic principles of experimental economics and power market theory,this paper combs with mature practices in experimental economics to sort out the general design process of economic experiments in the field of power market research,including: experimental goal determination,experimental object selection,reward mechanism design,etc.7 key links.And introduced the design ideas and usage methods of the power market economics test platform used in this article.It focuses on the research of the reward mechanism in the experiment of power market economics.First,the unit cost curve is fitted according to the actual coal power unit data in the Guangdong power market,and then unit bidding experiments are carried out according to two different remuneration mechanisms.The experiment found that the linear reward mechanism can better promote the experimental results to fit the reality than the ranking reward mechanism.It is because the linear reward mechanism can more finely describe the actual situation of the electricity market transaction,so it should be used in the electricity market economics experiment.Use a linear compensation mechanism.Then proposed the money course bonus and mixed reward mechanism,and designed an experiment to compare the full money reward mechanism and the money course bonus and mixed reward mechanism,and found that the experimenters who are not sensitive to money,the mixed reward mechanism has a better effect on their value induction.The experiment can reach a uniform state faster,and the experimental results are more credible.Then use experimental economics under this set of compensation mechanism to study the following two issues:(1)The application of experimental economics in power spot trial settlement.First,it summarizes and combs the electricity spot trial settlement process in the eight pilot provinces,and then analyzes the spot trial settlement mechanism in Guangdong and Zhejiang from the perspective of field economic experiments.Through analysis,the random settlement method can make the power spot trial settlement better reflect the superiority.A random settlement experiment in the electricity market is designed to prove the effectiveness of the random settlement method in the power spot trial settlement.In addition,the specific implementation plan and related formulas of random trial settlement in the power spot market are given,and two calculation examples are used to illustrate in detail.(2)Experimental economic research on subsidies for gas-fired units.Firstly,it summarizes the background of the subsidy of gas generating units,and on this basis,gives the mathematical model of the settlement mechanism of gas generating units.Then,an experiment was designed to compare the four gas-fired unit settlement mechanisms in the same power transaction scenario.Based on the economic experiment,a computer agent experiment was set up under the same conditions,and the results of the two experiments were compared horizontally.It is concluded that the use of direct pricing and direct subsidies will cause huge losses in social welfare.The use of cost estimation or contract for difference methods makes the subsidies received by gas-fired units more stable,and will not increase the total social power generation cost significantly.