| The large-scale development of new energy power generation has become the inevitable trend of power system development.Due to the uncertainty of new energy,it will cause many problems such as insufficient power grid adjustment ability after grid connection.Promoting new market players to participate in the spot market and giving play to the role of market optimization allocation of resources is an effective way to solve the problem of new energy consumption.However,due to the differences between different new market players and traditional units in physical characteristics,cost characteristics and other aspects,the existing market mechanism is still unable to fully adapt to the participation of new market players.In this context,relevant research is carried out on the improvement of the electricity market mechanism considering the characteristics of new market players.The main work is as follows:(1)Based on the analysis of the characteristics of new market subjects such as captive power plants,energy storage and wind power,and the clearing mechanism of the spot market,aiming at the current situation that the relevant research on the participation of captive power plants in peak regulation market is not perfect,considering the characteristics of cogeneration self-contained power plants,a market clearing model for self-provided power plants to participate in paid peak regulation is established.The simulation example shows that the self-provided power plant participating in paid peak regulation can effectively promote the wind power consumption without affecting the normal production process of the enterprise,but its regulation potential is restricted by the production plan of enterprises,and cannot play the same role as the equivalent public power plants.(2)Study the bidding deviation assessment mechanism for wind power in spot market.Firstly,the influence of wind power deviation on transaction cost is analyzed.From the perspective of the root causes of cost changes,the wind power bidding deviation assessment mechanism can be divided into two categories:the effect assessment mechanism that focuses on the impact of bidding deviation on the whole system,and the result assessment mechanism that focuses on punishing wind power plants to control their own bidding deviation rate within the scope of assessment exemption.The advantages and disadvantages of the two mechanisms are discussed in depth.In view of the actual situation of wind power cluster with smoothing effect,the different effects of single wind farm and wind power cluster as bidding deviation assessment objects are compared and analyzed.The simulation results show that the effect assessment of wind power cluster is more conducive to accurately reflect the relationship between bidding deviation and transaction cost.(3)Aiming at the distribution and settlement of the total deviation assessment cost under the effect assessment mechanism of wind power cluster to each wind farm,the cost settlement mechanism based on the initiation liability and the cost settlement mechanism of Shapley value method based on cooperative game theory are established respectively from the perspective of whether to consider the interest correlation of the assessed objects.The wind farm contribution index system is put forward,and the calculation method of each indicator under the wind power cluster environment is established.The CRITIC method is adopted to carry out indicator weight and calculate the redistribution coefficient,and the Shapley value method is improved accordingly.Finally,MDP(Modified Disruption Propensity)is used to analyze the propensity of wind farms to different settlement mechanisms.The simulation results verify the effectiveness of the settlement mechanism based on the improved Shapley value method,and analyze the applicable scenarios of different mechanisms.In conclusion,this paper considers the characteristics of the new market subject,and makes some improvements from the two aspects of spot market clearing mechanism and assessment and settlement mechanism,which has important reference value for the construction and improvement of related mechanisms in the electricity market. |