With the rapid development of the new energy vehicle industry,the research and development cycle of the new energy vehicle is gradually shortened,and the market competition is increasingly intensified.Many new energy vehicle enterprises begin to seek opportunities for cooperative research and development with members of the supply chain,in order to achieve the goals of shortening the research and development cycle,optimizing resource input decisions,and improving product technology content and profit.In recent years,the country attaches great importance to new energy vehicles,and the new energy vehicle industry has broad prospects.But in the absence of external incentives,enterprises usually lack of motivation to take the initiative to carry out technological innovation.In order to promote the development of the new energy vehicle industry,the government provides incentive policies and subsidies to support them,and the change of government subsidies will have an important impact on the decision-making of enterprises in the supply chain of new energy vehicles.Based on the above situation,in order to study the decision-making problem of resource input of new energy vehicle power battery supplier and new energy vehicle supplier in the production of power battery and new energy vehicle.This paper uses the dynamic game method to construct a resource investment decision model of supply chain.In this model,the battery supplier takes the leading role and the vehicle supplier takes the follower.The two parties adopt the cooperative sharing mode,and the resource investment of both parties consists of materials and cooperative efforts.Then,the solution of different resources invested by both parties to obtain the optimal profit under equilibrium condition is obtained,and the properties of the solution are discussed.The material input and cooperative effort input of battery supplier and vehicle supplier are affected by the degree of material loss of both parties,the importance of material input to revenue,the importance of total cooperative effort to revenue,and the proportion of their own revenue in cooperative sharing mode.In addition,the resource investment decisions of battery supplier only consider their own interests and are not affected by the decisions made by vehicle supplier,while the resource investment decisions of vehicle supplier are affected by the resource investment decisions of battery supplier.Secondly,this paper takes the government revenue subsidy and cost subsidy as exogenous variables,and establishes the resource input decision-making model of the new energy vehicle supply chain under the cooperative and sharing mode of the two government subsidy modes.The equilibrium solution of resource input between battery manufacturers and automobile manufacturers under government revenue subsidy and cost subsidy is obtained,and the influence of government subsidy parameters on material input decision,cooperative effort input decision and enterprise profit of battery manufacturers and automobile manufacturers is explored.The results show that in the case where the government subsidy is related to the technical level of both parties,with the improvement of the technical level,both parties will take the decision to increase the input of materials and cooperative efforts.And in the case that the government cost subsidy is related to the degree of material loss of both parties,with the decrease of the proportion of material loss degree,both parties will take the decision to increase the input of material and cooperative efforts.Finally,based on the CATL and NIO enterprise actual,simulation of three kinds of mode of new energy vehicles in the supply chain resources investment decision-making model,and analyzed the resource investment decision-making rules of battery manufacturers and automobile manufacturers under different government subsidy modes.The results show that under the government revenue subsidy mode and government cost subsidy mode,both battery supplier and vehicle supplier will increase their resource input,and the profit of both parties will increase compared with that without government subsidy.There are 23 figures,7 tables and 74 references in this paper. |