A Study On Evolutionary Games Of Low-Carbon Behaviors Of Construction Stakeholders Under Carbon Tax

Facing environmental problems such as energy shortage and climate change,as a developing country with large carbon emissions,the Chinese governments have introduced a series of carbon emission reduction policies and proposed the emission reduction goal,striving to reach the peak of carbon emission by 2030 and achieving carbon neutrality before2060.The construction industry is an important pillar industry of the national economy.Its traditional construction modes have the characteristics of high energy consumption and high emission,which affect the sustainable development of society and the environment.How to effectively promote energy conservation and emission reduction in the construction industry and accelerate the development of low-carbon buildings urgently need to be resolved.The article aims to explore the low-carbon behavior of construction industry stakeholders in the context of carbon tax policy.We sorted out relevant domestic and foreign studies and relevant theories about stakeholder theory,evolutionary game theory,etc.,defined the core stakeholders and clarified their interests and behavioral relationships.Based on this,two different multi-party evolutionary game models are constructed respectively,“construction enterprise Ⅰ-construction enterprise Ⅱ-government” and “construction enterprise –homebuyer-government”.The former model focuses on heterogeneous enterprises’ competitiveness,while the latter pays attention to the supply-demand relationship.By analyzing the strategic interactions among players and the effects of their low-carbon behaviors,some suggestions to jointly promote the development of low-carbon constructions are put forward.Combining theoretical analysis and simulation,the results show that the ideal strategies of “constructing low-carbon building” “buying low-carbon building” “incenting” selected are not only closely related to the behavior of other players but also affected by many factors.The direct incremental benefits of low-carbon buildings are conducive to the low-carbon choice of enterprises and homebuyers,but incremental costs are the obstacle.For construction enterprises,increasing their incremental return rate,low-carbon market shares and government subsidies can effectively increase the proportion of constructing low-carbon buildings.Improving the low-carbon awareness of homebuyers has a positive effect on their low-carbon behavior.Whether the governments choose an incentive strategy will weigh the relationship between policy promotion,incentive costs and the comprehensive benefits of promoting low-carbon constructions.Besides,the results showed that increasing the carbon tax rate helps enterprises to construct low-carbon buildings and the government to adopt incentive strategies.Due to the different sensitivities to policies of heterogeneous companies,too low or high tax rates are not effective.So the governments need to set a reasonable differentiated tax rate to stimulate the development of low-carbon constructions.This research provides a basis for the low-carbon decision-making of participating entities and the balance of their interests.It also lays a theoretical foundation for the government to introduce a scientific carbon tax policy,further promotes the low-carbon development of the construction industry in China.