Low-carbon Consumption Subsidy Strategy Under Asymmetric Carbon Emission Reduction Information

Government subsidies for low-carbon consumption can stimulate the demand for lowcarbon products to a certain extent,thus indirectly improving the sales profit of enterprises.However,not all manufacturers truthfully report their products’ carbon emission reduction level to the government.In the case of asymmetric emission reduction information,manufacturers of low-carbon products have the incentive to obtain higher subsidies,so as to use their information advantages to dishonestly transmit signals of high carbon emission reduction level to the government.Based on this,and considering consumers’ preference for low-carbon and subsidy policy,this paper uses signaling game theory to find the incentive compatibility mechanism for information sharing.Also,this paper studies the impact of subsidy policy on participants’ decisions and results under asymmetric emission reduction information by means of comparative analysis and numerical example analysis.Thus,it gives the relevant managerial insights of government subsidy policy and low-carbon enterprise activities.In this study,the following conclusions are drawn.First,under symmetric carbon reduction information,if consumers are moderately sensitive to subsidies,the subsidy policy can increase the generalized consumer surplus,and the government is willing to provide consumer subsidies for low-carbon products.At the same time,regardless of the level of emission reduction,manufacturers can indirectly get more sales profits through subsidies.Second,the equilibrium result of signaling game between the government and manufacturer under asymmetric information indicates that in the face of subsidy policy,the manufacturer with low emission reduction level will choose the same optimal price strategy as that without subsidies,while the manufacturer with high level may distort prices upward.The price distortion can make the low-level manufacturer loses the incentive to imitate due to the high imitation cost,so even in the case of information asymmetry,the manufacturer with high emission reduction level can be differentiated from low-level ones.At this point,however,the loss of consumer surplus caused by an increase in price of products might make the government not subsidize consumption.Third,in the case that the government decides to implement low-carbon consumption subsidy policy,both the manufacturer’s profit and generalized consumer surplus are positively correlated with consumers’ sensitivity to the subsidy policy.Therefore,within a certain range,the more sensitive consumers in the market are to subsidies,the more favorable the subsidy policies will be to both the government and manufacturer.Fourth,if subsidies are more effective in stimulating demand,the subsidy policy can stimulate the manufacturer to share information with the government to avoid the loss caused by the upward price distortion under asymmetric information.Therefore,only when consumers are sensitive to subsidies will they reach a consensus on government subsidies and information sharing.