Research On Cooperative Governance Of Beijing-Yianjin-hebei Ecological Environment Based On Mechanism Design Theory

The central government attaches great importance to the ecological environment governance of Beijing,Tianjin and Hebei and has taken a series of cooperative governance actions,but the effect is not sustainable.Therefore,starting with the benefit structure of all parties,this paper analyzes the specific reasons why the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei environmental cooperative governance is too difficult to sustain,and constructs the regional cooperative governance mechanism.This paper mainly makes the following progress:(1)The environmental behavior and influencing factors of Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei government,enterprises and the public,and the aim of the central government has been analyzed.Clearing the costs and benefits of different subjects in the process of participating in the collaborative governance of regional ecological environment,and clarifying the goal of mechanism design leaded by the central government.(2)Based on the heterogeneity characteristics of Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei governments,the evolutionary game model of intergovernmental cooperative governance without central government’s restraint is constructed.Based on the analysis of the evolutionary stabilization strategy of the model and the simulation based on the actual situation,this paper studies the specific reasons why the intergovernmental cooperative governance can not be realized: the cooperative cost and benefit in Hebei Province is asymmetric and not effectively compensated,and the existence of free rider gains makes it always choose the "non-cooperation" strategy.(3)On the vertical level,the evolutionary game model of multi-center governance of government,enterprise and public is constructed.According to the model,the influence mechanism of the environmental behavior between the three subjects is obtained,and the evolutionary stability strategy is further analyzed,and the local government’s controllable situation is simulated.Studies shows the specific reason why the multi-center cooperative governance can not be realized is that the local government’s fiscal revenue is not enough to afford the high environmental subsidy which can compensate the enterprise’s active governance cost effectively,which causes the conflict between the local government and the enterprise’s active environmental behavior,and the asymmetry of the cost and benefit of public participation also restricts its behavior choice.(4)The central government is introduced as the top designer to construct the intergovernmental and multi-center collaborative governance mechanism of Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei ecological environment.On the basis of(2)(3),this paper discusses what kind of policy combination used by the central government can achieve regional environmental cooperative governance,and ensures the government to "tell the truth" and prevent collusion between local government and enterprise.It is found that effective measures of cost compensation and redistribution of cooperation surplus,supplemented by rewards and penalties,and transfer of fines from betrayers,can effectively encourage and restrain the three governments to choose cooperative behavior strategies and report their true types.Effective transfer payment and policy and financial support of public participating can effectively motivate and restrain the government,enterprises and the public to choose positive environmental behavior strategies and prevent government-enterprise collusion.Finally,according to the conclusion of the study,this paper puts forward the policy suggestions such as constructing the authoritative joint governance structure,perfecting the environmental regulation policy and ecological compensation mechanism,perfecting the public participation and reward system and the appraisal system of government officials.